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Overview of the introduction
+e publication of the seminal collectivework!eGeneric Book (Carlson andPelletier
) gave rise to a ,ourishing research program. A principal contribution of !e
Generic Book was the establishment of a uni-ed terminology that paved the way for
detailed and speci-c studies, the results of which are intended to be cumulative. Since
then, much of the research has focused on syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic issues,
and researchers have made important advances within these -elds as well as at their
interfaces.
+e growing interest in genericity and subsequent development of new analyses
have been nourished by a synergy between three areas of study.
First, the empirical range of facts pertaining to genericity has widened impressively.
During the last decade, much work has been conducted on various languages that are
typologically remote from English, such as the Romance languages, Creole languages,
Hindi, Korean, Chinese, and Japanese.
Second, developments in key areas of theoretical linguistics and related -elds have
contributed to the understanding of old and new facts pertaining to genericity.+ese
areas include logics of conditionals and vagueness, modeling of modalities, and alge-
braic approaches to plurality.
Finally, new theoretical tools in lexical semantics, type theory, and information
theory have made it possible to model important issues that arise at the interface
between the lexicon, the syntax, and the semantics of generic expressions.
Interaction between these areas of research has brought about questions as to what
might be the sources of genericity itself. While the theory at the time of!e Generic
Book relied heavily on the contribution of a hidden operator GEN (-rst introduced
in Farkas and Sugioka ), as a replacement for the unitary Carlsonian operator
Gn (Carlson b), subsequent research has tried to individuate the sources of the
generic interpretation in overt material in generically interpreted sentences. +ese
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developments in formal semantics and pragmatics echo recent -ndings in cognitive
science, which seem to favor theories of generics as primarily non-quanti-cational
(see Leslie ).
Linguistic research on generics has developed in three primary directions. Some
authors have focused on the generic interpretation of the subject DP. +is research
has mostly concentrated on the notion of kind and its possible expression in natural
languages. Other authors locate the sources of genericity in the VP. And a third group,
starting from the assumption that genericity is a feature of the sentence rather than
one of its components, have focused on the variety of generic readings of generic
sentences.
+is introduction is organized in three parts that follow these lines of research.
+e -rst part focuses on the syntactic structure and compositional interpretation of
DPs, and frames the ontological issues related to reference to kinds in this context.
What is the role of DPs in generic sentences, and what is the proper contribution of
determiners and nouns to generic interpretation? To account for the variety of types of
noun phraseswhich refer to kinds across languages (singular and plural bare nouns, as
well as singular and plural de-nite noun phrases), it is necessary to precisely describe
the ontology of the domain of reference, the denotation of singular and plural nouns,
and the contribution of de-nite determiners and of the plural morpheme. +is part
thus addresses a series of ontological issues relevant to the analysis of natural language:
in order to account for linguistic data,mustwe postulate the existence of kinds, viewed
as a type of entities, distinguished from particulars or tokens?What is the relationship
between kinds and sets of entities, between kinds and properties, between kinds and
sets of properties? +ere is a rich literature on these topics in philosophy, but our
aim in this -rst part is not to propose an overview of the philosophical debate. For
instance, when we ask whether non-ordinary individuals such as kinds exist, we wish
to investigate whether natural language semantics needs to postulate the existence
of entities such as kinds in order to achieve empirical adequacy, and what type of
expressions (and in what languages) denote such entities.
+e second part is comprised of three sections which are dedicated respectively
to the stage-level/individual-level distinction, to the contribution of unboundedness
and plurality, and to the dispositional reading of generic sentences. +e questions
addressed in this part pertain to the relationship between genericity, habituality,
abilities, and dispositions. We survey various accounts of these notions and contrast
genericity viewed as the repetition of events across relevant situations with genericity
as an explicative principle for the manifestation of properties. We compare the view
that ILPs are context-independentwith the view that considers them asmaximal sums
of their manifestations. Likewise we explore the view of habituality as repetitions of
events, as opposed to abilities as explicative behaviors. +e roles of aspect and tense
are taken into account in the discussion of these notions.
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+e third part examines the type of generic sentences, opposing analytic vs syn-
thetic judgments, and raises the question of the notion of normality. It comprises two
sections. +e -rst section addresses the issue of the linguistic manifestation of the
analytic/synthetic distinction and investigates the sources of the available interpreta-
tions for inde-nite generic sentences, bare plurals, and de-nite plural generics. It starts
from the old assumption that inde-nite singular generics are used to express analytic
statements, and questions both the descriptive and theoretical well-foundedness of
this claim. It thus considers whether the analytic/synthetic distinction plays a role
in natural language semantics, and when this is recognized to be the case, asks why
certain linguistic forms are preferred for expressing certain types of judgment. +e
second section is dedicated to the discussion of the notion of normality, comparing
the view of normality as a statistical fact and the view of normality as a normative one.
. Genericity and the DP
Traditionally, generic sentences have been thought of as falling into two categories:
(i) those sentences in which genericity comes from theDP (what Krifka et al. 
called reference to a kind), as in (a) and (b), and
(ii) those sentences in which genericity comes as a feature of the whole sentence
(called characterizing sentences in Krifka et al. ) as in ().
In (a) the DP the potato does not refer to a particular potato, but to a type of
vegetable, the kind Potato.+e same holds for the DP potatoes in (b), which does not
refer to a particular set of potatoes, but rather to potatoes as a kind. (a) and (b) share
the property of expressing claims about kinds. +us both DPs are said to be kind-
referring DPs. +e case is di/erent in (): the sentence does not report a particular
event, but instead describes a habit (what John usually does a0er dinner), a kind of
generalization over events. Contra to Krifka et al. who assume that in () genericity is
a feature of the whole sentence, we assume that genericity comes from the VP.
() a. +e potato was -rst cultivated in South America.
b. Potatoes were -rst cultivated in South America.
() John smokes a cigar a0er dinner.
As noted by Krifka et al., both phenomena can occur simultaneously, as in ().
() a. Potatoes are served whole or mashed as a cooked vegetable.
b. +e potato is highly digestible.
+e-rst part of this introduction focuses on kind-referringDPs, addressing twomajor
topics:
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(i) What are the linguistic forms that can be used to refer to kinds across languages
and what are the conditions governing their uses as well as the subtle semantic
di/erences that they convey? While in English bare plurals and singular def-
inite DPs may be kind-referring, in other languages, bare singulars or plural
de-nite DPs also seem to be appropriate for referring to kinds.
(ii) How can we account for the semantic computation of kind-referring DPs and
what are the consequences of assuming kind reference into the ontology of
natural language?
To answer these questions, we -rst consider English bare plurals and begin with a
presentation of two seminal studies about kinds, namely Carlson (b) and Chier-
chia (). +ese studies have shown that English bare plurals may be analyzed
as referring to kinds in all of their uses. Carlson’s proposal is based on a series of
contrasts between bare plurals and inde-nites in English. Chierchia has shown how
to integrate Carlson’s proposals within a formal framework which uses lattice struc-
tures (to account for plurality), operators, and type-shi0ing rules (to establish a link
between kinds and properties). Sections .. and .. present two other proposals,
developed contra Carlson and Chierchia, according to which English bare plurals
refer directly to kinds: (i) the ambiguity hypothesis, according to which bare plurals
are ambiguous between an inde-nite and a generic interpretation and (ii) the property
denotation hypothesis, based on the idea that bare plurals denote properties and may
be incorporated into the VP. We present arguments for and against each of these
proposals. In the last part, we consider DPs other than English bare plurals which
are kind-referring, and examine data from a multitude of languages, in particular
Romance languages and languages without determiners such as Hindi, whichmust be
accounted for. Initially, investigations into kind-reference were primarily concerned
with English bare plurals, and to a lesser extent English de-nite singulars. However
it can be shown that most, if not all, DPs can be interpreted as kind-referring given
the appropriate context, and thus we explore the source of genericity in DPs. In the
last section, we assume that there is no generic determiner, but that the source of
genericity in the nominal domain is anchored in the noun itself, which is ambiguous
and may describe a property of kind rather than a property of individual. To account
for the varieties of linguistic forms which are interpreted as referring to kinds, we
introduce a distinction between two types of kind-referring DPs: DPs which refer
directly to a kind and DPs which refer indirectly to a kind.
.. English bare plurals as kind-referring DPs
... Carlson () An important starting point for any discussion of genericity
is Carlson’s (b) seminal study about bare plurals (BPs) and kind reference. Carl-
son showed that BPs in English are not the plural counterpart of inde-nite singulars
(ISs). +e book contains ample evidence that constrasts BPs and ISs: they do not
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give rise to the same ambiguities when they interact with quanti-ed DPs, with modal
expressions, or with temporal adverbs. Examples () through () are Carlson’s original
examples.
() a. Everyone read a book on caterpillars.
b. Everyone read books on caterpillars.
() a. A dog was everywhere.
b. Dogs were everywhere.
() a. An accident happened today at , : and .
b. Accidents happened today at , : and .
() a. Max discovered two rabbits in his yard (in two hours / ??for two hours).
b. Max discovered rabbits in his yard (??in two hours / for two hours).
() a. ??Harvey continued to kill a rabbit.
b. Harvey continued to kill rabbits.
In (a), ‘a book on caterpillars’ can be interpreted with a narrow-scope or wide-scope
reading. But bare plurals are incompatible with a wide-scope interpretation, as we
see in (b), which cannot mean ‘there are books on caterpillars that everyone read’.
No speci-c collection of books is evoked. With the bare plural ‘books on caterpillars’,
only the narrow-scope interpretation is available. (a) is odd: it seems to imply that
the same dog occupies di/erent places, which does con,ict with our knowledge that
dogs are not ubiquitous. On the other hand, (b) expresses a perfectly sensible and
possibly true proposition, namely that there were di/erent dogs in di/erent locations.
So with (b), inverse scope is available: the universal everywhere can scope over the
BP, even if everywhere doesn’t c-command ‘dogs’ at the surface. +e examples in ()
illustrate scopal interpretations with respect to temporal adverbials. It seems that the
plural can take narrower scope than the singular. To interpret (a), we imagine the
same type of accident occurring three times on the same day, such as a -re, explosion,
or power outage.+e reading involving three accidents of di/erent types, e.g. a -re, an
explosion, and a power cut all on the same day, is unavailable. On the other hand, in
(b), we are not asked to imagine recurrent accidents.+e contrast in () concerns the
interaction between inde-niteDPs and bare plurals on the one hand and aspect on the
other. () describes a situation inwhichMaxneeded twohours to discover two rabbits,
and the sentence becomes bizarre if we replace in two hours by for two hours. +e
relevant opposition here is telic vs atelic. For-complements are incompatible with telic
processes. Finally, example () illustrates the interaction between plurality and aspect.
When the verb kill is used with a bare plural argument, the aspect of the predicate
changes and becomes durative. +is explains why it can combine with an aspectual
verb like continue. But the case with singular inde-nites is di/erent. Consequently,
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Carlson concludes that bare plurals cannot be analyzed as the plural counterpart of
singular inde-nites, but are rather comparable to proper names which denote kinds.
Like proper names, they are bare and they can serve to instantiate di/erent values of
a universal quanti-cation, as illustrated in () and ():
() a. One of these men sleeps.
b. ∃x[x is a man][x sleeps]
c. John sleeps or Peter sleeps or Bill sleeps . . .
() a. One of these kinds of bird ,ies.
b. ∃x[x is a kind of birds][x ,ies]
c. Sparrows ,y or penguins ,y or chicken ,y . . .
(a) is true if and only if (c) is true, and (a) is true if and only if (c) is true.
Intuitively, we have assigned proper names to x in the logical form (b), and names of
kinds to x in the logical form (b). According to Carlson, the bare plural acts as the
proper name of a kind, and kinds are to be construed as individuals.
Carlson was the -rst to propose enriching the ontology with kinds, a new type of
entity distinct from ‘normal individuals’ like John. But he also introduced a distinction
between individuals and stages of individuals.+is distinction parallels the distinction
between properties and states. Carlson assumes that states can be predicated not of
John, but of stages of John. A stage of individual is a temporally bounded portion of
that individual. ‘+e stages aren’t simply things that are; they are more akin to things
that happen. +at is, stages are conceived of as being much more closely related to
events than to objects.’ (Carlson b: ). A stage of an individual corresponds to
the realization of that individual at a certain time. An individual can be identi-edwith
the set of its stages. +is is illustrated in (), for John. R(x,j) means that x is a stage
of John, in other words, x is a realization of the individual j.
() λxR(x, j)
Properties are predicated of an individual, and states are predicated of a stage of an
individual. For example, being intelligent is a property of John (see (a)), and being
sick is a not a property of John, but rather a state, which can be predicated of one of
John’s realizations (see (a)). (a) corresponds to the Logical Form (b), which
reduces to (c), and (a) translates to (b), which reduces to (c).
() a. John is intelligent.
b. λPP(j) I
c. I(j)
 Nevertheless, it is important to note that substitutional interpretation of (a) and (a) is possible if
and only if there are names for all the men and names for all the species of birds. +is is a limit to this
approach, which doesn’t account for the intensional dimension of kinds.
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() a. John is sick.
b. λPP(j) λx∃y[R(y, x)∧sick(y)]
c. ∃y [R(y,j) ∧ sick (y)]
When we compare John runs and John is running, we see the same type of distinction:
runs is a property (in this case a disposition or habit), and is running is a state. Carlson
assumes that the progressive turns a property into a state.
() a. John λP P(j)
b. John runs run(j)
c. John is running ∃y[R(y, j)∧run(y)]
We see the same thing with the bare plural dogswhich is analyzed as a name of a kind.
To this extent, dogs and John are comparable.
() a. Dogs λP P(d)
b. Dogs run run(d)
c. Dogs are running ∃y [R(y, d)∧run(y)]
It follows that BPs are not ambiguous between existential and generic interpretation,
but rather in all of their uses, they denote kinds.WhenBPs are existentially interpreted
(as in (c)), the existential quanti-er comes from the predicate, which is a predicate
of a stage of an individual, and not from the BP in itself.
According to Carlson, English displays a speci-c form that refers to kinds, namely
bare plurals. He claims that as such, English bare plurals are unanalyzable: they
directly refer to kinds, which are abstract entities, not reducible to sets of individuals.
+e following quotation makes this fact explicit.
() ‘Let us agree then to treat bare NPs as a proper name of a kind, and let us think
of kinds as being abstract individuals. In this treatment, Bare NPs are treated
semantically as if they were unanalyzable wholes’ (Carlson b: )
Since bare plurals are names of kinds, they can be viewed as the set of all the properties
that the kind has, just as a proper name of a ‘normal’ individual can be identi-ed, in
Montague Grammar, as the set of all properties this individual has.
() a. proper name of individual: John λP P(j)
b. proper name of kind: dogs λP P(d)
In summation, Carlson proposes to distinguish two types of entities: ‘normal’ individ-
uals and kinds.+e most important di/erence between kinds and normal individuals
concerns their location: ‘Kinds are a little di/erent from more normal individuals in
 In the following formulas, the same predicate ‘run’ is applied both to an individual and to a stage of
individual.+is can be resolved using the notation proposed by Parsons (). We suppress this notation
for the sake of simplicity.
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that kinds can be here and there, whereas normal individuals are generally con-ned
to one location, at a given time.’ (Carlson b: ). He introduces another distinc-
tion between individuals and stages of individuals that correlates with the di/erence
between two types of predicates: i-level predicates, which denote stable properties and
are predicated of individuals, and s-level predicates which refer to states, are tempo-
rally anchored, and are predicated of stages of individuals. He uses the distinction
between these two classes of predicates to account for habitual sentences, and draws
a parallel between generic sentences based on quanti-cation over individuals such as
(a), and habitual sentences such as (b). In each case, an i-level predicate is applied
to a name.
() a. Whales are mammals.
b. John smokes.
Carlson’s analysis is very elegant: it presents a uni-ed analysis of English bare plurals
and predicts the correct existential and generic readings. Nevertheless, it is important
to note that his analysis is not compositional to the extent that it does not take into
account the fact that bare plurals involve a plural morpheme.
... Chierchia () Chierchia’s re,ection on the issue of reference begins with
a cross-linguistic comparison. Chierchia proposed a typological classi-cation of DPs
according to the features [+/- argument, +/- predicate]. +is classi-cation is based
on the idea that the NP could denote either properties or kinds: in some languages
they denote kinds, in others they denote properties, and in yet others they can denote
either. According to him, kinds are entities, and as such, can be the syntactic argu-
ment of verbs just like proper names. Consequently, in languages where NPs denote
kinds, they can serve as arguments of verbs: no DPs are needed and bare nouns
are allowed in argument position. On the contrary, in languages where NPs denote
properties, bare nouns cannot appear in argument position and a determiner is always
needed.
Chierchia assumes that this di/erence between languages corresponds with a
semantic parameter and he claims that the cross-linguistic variations in the way lan-
guages refer to kinds can be derived from this semantic parameter. Chierchia assumes
that this semantic parameter is composed of two features [+/– argument] and [+/–
predicate]. He claims that:
• N can function as an argument (being of type e either an object or a kind) i/ N
is [+ argument]
• N can function as a predicate (being of type 〈e,t〉) and be used to restrict the
range of determiners i/ N is [+ predicate]
• If N is [+ argument, + predicate], both are possible
• No language can be [– argument, – predicate]
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Although very in,uential, Chierchia’s proposal has also been much debated in the
literature. +e main points of debate concern not only the data (see a.o. Longobardi
; Zamparelli ) and the validity of some empirical predictions (see a.o. Chung
; Schmitt and Munn ; Munn and Schmitt  on Brazilian Portuguese;
Déprez  on Haitian Creole; Dayal  on Hindi) but also the very idea of
such a semantic parameter, which would be enough to base a typology of languages.
Nonetheless, Chierchia’s analysis had the virtue of extending the study of the nominal
expression of genericity to languages other than English. Another important aspect
of his paper is that it presents an elaboration of Carlson’s thesis within a formal
framework, on which we will focus here.
Chierchia is a neo-Carlsonian, his proposals may be viewed as an elaboration of
Carlson’s analysis, as he assumes that English bare plurals are not ambiguous, but
rather must be analyzed as kind-referring in all of their uses. Nevertheless, their
proposals di/er on several points.
• First, Chierchia doesn’t use the notion of stage of an individual, which played a
crucial role in Carlson’s analysis, since it gives rise to a distinction between two
types of predicates, i.e. individual-level predicates on the one hand and stage-
level predicates in the other.
• Secondly, Chierchia analyzes the semantic contribution of plurality in English
bare plurals. Indeed, contra Carlson, who compares English bare plurals with
proper names (they are analyzed as constants at the logical form and are bare,
i.e. built without any determiner), Chierchia proposes a compositional analysis
of English bare plurals, in which the semantic import of the plural morpheme is
analyzed. Bare plurals result from the composition of a plural morpheme with a
singular predicate to form a plural predicate, which is nominalized.
• Finally, Chierchia proposes a formal and compositional analysis of kind-
referring DPs. He addresses the ontological issues related to the structure of the
domain of reference of discourse entities, and he makes explicit the relations
between singular individuals, plural individuals, kinds, and properties. He intro-
duces new operators, the up and the down operators, which allow for an account
of the relations between individuals and properties.
Chierchia relied on previous formal work on the semantics of plurals by Link (a)
and Landman (, , ), which argued that the formal ontology of natural
language should encompass both singular and plural individuals. Chierchia assumed
that singular count nouns denote singular properties, i.e. properties that are true of
singular individuals, while plural count nouns denote plural properties, i.e. properties
 In this short presentation of Chierchia’s proposal, we only consider count nouns. But in his paper,
Chierchia also accounts for mass nouns. On his analysis, mass nouns come out of the lexicon already plu-
ralized; they neutralize the singular/plural distinction. In other terms,mass nouns denote plural properties.
See Chierchia (:  et seq.)
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that are true of plural individuals. Singular individuals are atomic entities of type e,
and plural individuals may be viewed either as sets of singular individuals (such as
{a,b,c}) or as sums of individuals (such as a ⊕ b ⊕ c). +e domain involving both
singular and plural entities forms a complete atomic join semilattice, built from the
bottom, which involves singular entities, via either the operator ∪ or the operator
⊕. Since the domain of reference is a semilattice in both cases, there always is a
maximal element in this lattice, and this maximal element corresponds precisely to
the denotation of English bare plurals, or, in other terms, always denotes a kind.
Chierchia’s claim is that a bare plural has a kind as its denotation, where the kind is
obtained by applying the downoperator to the plural property associatedwith the bare
noun. +e down operator is intensional: it maps any given world onto the maximal
plural individual having the property associated with the noun.
Chierchia (: ) claims that ‘kinds and (plural) properties can in away be seen
as twomodes of packaging the same information’. He only considers plural properties
because plurality plays a crucial role in his analysis.+ere is no kind associated with
nouns such asGod or sun, as these nouns denote properties of singular entities, which
can not be pluralized. Indeed, there is only one God and one sun in every possible
world.
Chierchia raised the issue of the relation between kind and property, and intro-
duced the down and up operators that make it possible to switch from one to the
other.
Chierchia also uses the Russellian operator iota. Iota applies to the denotation of a
singular or plural noun and yields the largest member included in this denotation, if
there is one. Consequently, the iota operator is a maximalization operator: when the
noun is plural, [[ιNs]] yields the largest plurality of [[Ns]]; when the noun is singular,
since there is no atom larger than any other one, [[ιN]] is only de-ned for singletons.
It is important to highlight that iota is an operator de-ned with respect to a given
world.
Besides the iota, Chierchia introduces another operator, the down operator, which
is a nominalization operator. It can only apply to plural properties, and according
Chierchia it is, to some extent, an intensional iota (cf. p. , n. ). Ps is the extension
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() For any property P and world or situation s,
∩P = λs ιPs, if λs ιPs is in K (the set of kinds)
unde-ned otherwise
+e down operator, which is also calledNOM in some papers, is simply an intensional
version of the maximality operator associated with the de-nite determiner:
() Plural Kind Formation: NOM: λP〈s,〈e,t〉〉λs ι x[Ps(x)]
Regular De-niteness IOTA: λP〈s,〈e,t〉〉 ι x[Ps(x)]
Let us now return to English bare plurals. Chierchia assumes that they directly refer
to kinds. What is not very clear in Chierchia’s proposal is the semantic type assigned
to kinds. Are they of type e or 〈s,e〉? Do they refer to singular or plural entities?
Chierchia (: ) writes that ‘it seems natural to identify a kind in any given
world (or situation) with the totality of its instances’. +e di3culty is to determine
whether and how, in a given world, Chierchia makes a distinction between a kind and
the totality of the individuals which belong to the kind. +is issue is not absolutely
crucial for the analysis of English, which has two distinct forms, bare plurals on the
one hand, and plural de-nites on the other (see ()). But for a language such as
French, inwhich there are no bare nouns, it is not immediately obviouswhether plural
de-nites are ambiguous between referring to a kind and referring to a maximal set of
individuals (note that the examples in (), which are the French counterparts of (),
both contain de-nite plurals).
() a. Whales are becoming extinct.
b. +e whales are late this year.
() a. Les baleines sont en voie de disparition.
b. Les baleines sont en retard cette année.
+en Chierchia analyzes generic sentences containing an NP which denotes a kind.
He distinguishes the case of direct kind predication, in which the predicate is a kind-
level predicate as in (a), from the case where BPs occur with non-kind-selecting
predicates, as in (b) and (c). In this case, BPs typically give rise to a universal
reading in generic contexts, and to an existential one in episodic contexts.
() a. Whales are becoming extinct.
b. Whales breathe under water.
c. Whales were beached near the house this morning.
Whenever an object-level argument slot in a predicate is -lled by a kind in an episodic
sentence, the predicate type is automatically adjusted and predication is no longer on
the kind but on the individuals which instantiate the kind. Chierchia (: ) calls
this mechanism the derived kind predication (see ()).
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() Derived Kind Predication (DKP):
If P applies to ordinary individuals and k denotes a kind,
then P(k) = ∃x[∪k(x) ∧ P(x)]
+is rule explains the existential readings for kind-referring DPs. In (), the DP
denotes a kind and occurs in an episodic sentence. () is about instances of the kind,
and the LF associated with it is given in (b) and is obtained by applying DKP.+e
same mechanism is applied in (); (c) is obtained from (b) via DKP.
() a. +at kind of animal is ruining my garden.
b. ∃x [ ∪ that kind of animal (x) ∧ ruin my garden (x)]
() a. Lions are ruining my garden.
b. ruin my garden ( ∩ lions)
c. ∃x [ ∪∩ lions(x) ∧ ruin my garden (x)]
In characterizing sentences, Chierchia adopts a quanti-cational analysis in terms of
the GEN operator as in Chierchia () and in Krifka et al. ().+is is illustrated
in () but also in a sentence like (a) including a DP built with the noun kind in
subject position.
() a. Dogs barks.
b. GEN x,s [ ∪∩dog(x) ∧ C(x,s)] [bark(x,s)]
() a. [+at kind]k [suckles its young]o
b. GEN x,s [ ∪that kind(x) ∧ C(x,s)] [suckles its young(x,s)]
In () and (a), the subject is a kind-referring DP, and variables over instances of
the kind are accommodated in the restriction of the quanti-er GEN. C is a contex-
tual restriction on appropriate individuals and situations. Chierchia assumes that the
process whereby this happens is analogous to that illustrated in ().
() a. +ose boys are mostly Italian.
b. MOST x [ x ≤ those boys] [Italian(x)]
To conclude, let us highlight a di/erence between the proposals of Carlson and Chier-
chia. On Carlson’s analysis, existential readings are correlated with s-level predicates,
and theVP is the source of the existential interpretation of BPs, since s-level predicates
involve an existential quanti-er ranging over a stage of an individual. For Chierchia,
existential readings of BPs always come from the application of DKP and are the
consequence of a typemismatch between the predicate and its argument. Unlike what
happens in Carlson’s original proposal, DKP is not a lexical operation on predicates
but a rather type shi0er that applies on demand.
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.. !e ambiguity hypothesis
... Proposal Contra Carlson and Chierchia, who assume that both existential
and generic interpretations of English BPs are derived from kind reference, Wilkin-
son (), Diesing (), and Gerstner-Link and Krifka () claim that English
BPs are systematically ambiguous between Heimian inde-nites and kind-denoting
DPs. As kind-denoting terms, they may appear in an argument position of kind-
level predicates. And as inde-nites, they may be arguments of object-level predicates.
Like other inde-nites, they introduce discourse referents, which can be caught by the
generic operator or by existential closure, depending on the context and in particular
the aspect of the verb. Let us consider the three following sentences, which illustrate
each type of con-guration. In (a), the DP is argument of a kind-level predicate. It
is analyzed as a name of kind, as shown in (b). In (a) and (a), the DP dogs is
the argument of an object-level predicate. It is analyzed as an inde-nite DP, which
introduces a free variable in the logical form. In (b), the variable x is bound by
the generic quanti-er GEN, a unselective quanti-er which is introduced by the VP
bark which denotes a disposition or a habit. Krifka and Gerstner-Link have shown
that the relation between habituals and genericity can be formally incorporated by
the introduction of variables over situations.+ey give an interpretation of habituals
in terms of generic quanti-cation over situations (see (b)). We can conclude that
in (a), the generic interpretation of the bare plural is not due to the bare plural
itself, but to the generic operator associated with the verb ‘bark’. On the contrary, in
(a), the progressive form barking excludes a habitual interpretation. +e VP does
not introduce a quanti-er, and consequently the free variable associated with the
bare plural is bound by the existential quanti-er introduced by the rule of existential
closure (see (b)).
() a. Whales will be extinct soon.
b. will-be-extinct-soon (W)
() a. Dogs bark.
b. GEN s, x [dogs(s, x) ∧ in(s, x)] [bark(s, x)]
() a. Dogs are barking.
b. ∃ s, x [dogs(s, x) ∧ barking(s, x)]
... Advantages +e ambiguity hypothesis presents several advantages. First, it
seems more appropriate than Carlsonian or neo-Carlsonian approaches to account
for languages such as French, Finnish, or Japanese in which generic and existential
readings are associated with di/erent morphological realizations. In French, the def-
inite plural determiner ‘les’ is used to refer either to a kind or to a speci-c group of
dogs, whose existence is not asserted but presupposed (see (a)), while the inde-nite
determiner ‘des’ is used in the existential reading, and is incompatible with generic
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readings (see (b)). () illustrates the fact that Finnish uses nominative case for
kind-denotingDPs (which occur in characterizing sentences), while the partitive case
is used for existential readings (associated with episodic sentences). And () shows
that in Japanese, kind-referring DPs carry a topic marker, which is replaced by the
nominative case in episodic sentences, triggering an existential reading.
() a. Les chiens aboient (French: GEN/∃)
def.PL dogs bark
Dogs bark.
b. Des chiens ont aboyé (*GEN/∃)
Indef.PL dogs barked
Dogs barked.
() a. Koirat haukkuvat (Finnish: GEN/*∃)
Dogs.NOM bark.PL
Dogs bark.
b. Koiria haukku (*GEN/∃)
dogs.PART bark.SG
Dogs are barking.
() a. Inu wa hasiru (Japanese: GEN/*∃))
dog TOP run
Dogs run. / A dog runs.
b. Inu ga hasitte iru (*GEN/∃)
dog NOM run PROGR
Dogs are running. / A dog is running.
A second advantage is that the ambiguity hypothesis predicts both existential and
generic readings for BP subjects of stage-level predicates (see ()). It also accounts for
data such as (a) and (a), observed by Carlson but le0 unexplained by his analysis.
() Firemen are available.
() a. John is looking for (parts of that machine/people in the next room)
b. John is looking for (machines/people)
() a. John didn’t see (parts of that machine/people in the next room)
b. John didn’t see (machines/people)
Sentence (a) allows both an opaque reading and a transparent one, unlike (b),
which only allows an opaque one. Something comparable happens with sentence
(a), which involves a negation. (a) is ambiguous: on one reading it means that
John did not see any part of themachine; on the other it says that there are parts of the
machine that John didn’t see.+e existential quanti-er associated with the bare plural
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scopally interacts with negation in a way that sharply contrasts with the minimally
di/erent sentence (b). Indeed, (b) is non-ambiguous: the BP is in the scope of
the negation and cannot have scope over the VP. Carlson’s analysis does not explain
this di/erence: indeed, on his analysis, all BPs denote kinds and the existential or
generic readings always depend on the predicate. But in examples () and (), the
verb is the same. +is leads to the conclusion that some BPs do not denote kinds.
+is is in contradiction with Carlson’s analysis of English bare plurals, but absolutely
compatible with the ambiguity hypothesis. In this framework, BPs like parts of that
machine and people in the next room, which do not denote kinds, should behave like
regular inde-nites.
+e ambiguity hypothesis also resolves the problem raised by the presence of BPs
in there-sentences. In the Carlsonian approach, BPs are analyzed as names of kinds,
and as such, may be compared with de-nite DPs. And it is well-known that de-nite
DPs cannot appear in the argument position of there-sentences, as illustrated in (a).
However BPs may occur in there-sentences (see (b)). And so do kind-referring
DPs built with the common noun kind, as in (c).+ese data, which need a special
explanation in either the Carlson or Chierchia framework, are not problematic if BPs
are analyzed as ambiguous.
() a. *+ere is John/that boy/the boy.
b. +ere are dogs.
c. +ere is that kind of animal in the zoo.
And -nally, data concerning scopemay be viewed as providing an empirical argument
in favor of the ambiguity hypothesis. Indeed, if BPs are kind-referring, as assumed by
Carlson and Chierchia, they must take narrow scope. Even if this is frequently the
case, empirical research has found some counter-examples. In this volume, Le Bruyn,
Min Que, and de Swart present an experimental investigation on the scope of English
bare plurals andMandarin Chinese and Dutch bare nominals.+eir results show that
in appropriate contexts, BPs are actually able to take wide scope, just like inde-nites.
+is result casts doubts on Carlson’s (b) assertion that BPs in English necessarily
take narrow scope with respect to other scope-bearing operators in the sentence.+is
paper defends the idea that even if wide-scope readings of BPs are rare, such readings
are not de-nitively excluded by the grammar.
 Carlson and Chierchia observed that BPs such as parts of that machine or boys sitting here, people in
the next room give rise to wide-scope readings. +ey cannot account for that in their framework, since
according to them, all bare plurals refer to kinds. Nevertheless, they recognize that intuitively these BPs are
not associated with anything su3ciently law-like as to be regarded as a kind.+e open issue is to determine
why such bare plurals are unable to denote kinds. Cohen suggests an alternative explanation, that does
not require kind reference. According to him, such BPs allow wide-scope readings because they refer to a
speci-c group of individuals, anchored in time and space and consequently are strong DPs.
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... Problems One problem with the ambiguity hypothesis is that it also pre-
dicts that BP subjects of individual-level predicates have both generic and existential
readings, which is not supported by the data. For example (a) only has the generic
reading, which corresponds to (b) and involves an overt adverb of quanti-cation.
() a. Firemen are intelligent.
b. Firemen usually are intelligent.
Diesing () proposes to solve the problem of (a) by limiting existential closure
to the VP. She claims that subjects of stage-level predicates are generated in Spec VP,
whereas subjects of individual-level predicates are generated in Spec IP. Consequently,
subjects of individual-level predicates cannot be bound by existential closure, and thus
cannot give rise to existential readings.
To summarize, neither the theory according to which BPs are uniformly kind-
referring, nor the ambiguity hypothesis are able to correctly account for the complex-
ity of data. On the one hand, there is clear evidence that BPs are not interpreted only as
the plural versions of inde-nite DPs (see Carlson on scope properties of English BPs);
on the other, there is equally clear evidence that not all uses of bare BPs refer to kinds.
+ey signi-cantly di/er from other kind-referring DPs such as de-nite singular DPs,
and they show many similarities with inde-nite NPs. To solve this dilemma, Krifka
() elaborates a new theory of bare nouns, according to which they are neither
kind-referring, nor inde-nites, but basically properties, which can be li0ed to one or
the other interpretation in appropriate linguistic contexts.
.. Bare plurals and property denotation
... Krifka () Krifka discusses an alternative to Chierchia () that
remains quite close in spirit to this work, to the extent that he assumes that the NP
denotation can be type-shi0ed and that type shi0ing does not occur freely, but only as
a last-resort principle, if there is a type mismatch and the language cannot achieve the
same e/ect by overt means. In other words, type shi0ing is blocked by the existence
of overt determiners.
Krifka uses the same type-shi0ing operators as Chierchia, namely the existential
type shi0 inherited from Partee (), the iota operator which turns a set into its
maximal element, and the down operator which turns a property into a kind. Both
authors also consider that generic readings of BPs in characterizing sentences such
as dogs bark involve a phonologically null generic quanti-er, whose meaning can be
glossed by in general, and both assume that existential readings of BPs are provided by
type shi0ing.+ey also share the idea that type shi0ing is local, which explains why
existential BPs have always narrow scope.
+e main di/erence between Krifka and Chierchia concerns the way they analyze
bare plurals. As we have seen above, according to Chierchia, BPs always denote kinds,
and existential readings of BPs are derived from kind reference via the DKP rule.
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For Krifka, however, BPs denote properties in all of their uses; generic as well as
existential readings are obtained in context by type shi0ing from this basic property
denotation. Before looking for empirical arguments that support one or the other of
these hypotheses, let us present Krifka’s analysis.
In his analysis of bare plurals, Krifka pays attention to the compositional derivation
of expressions. +e basic idea is that count nouns have a number argument in their
lexical representation (see (a)).
DOG(w, n, x) means that in the world w, the individual x consists of n dogs. DOG
is of type 〈s,〈n,〈e,t〉〉〉. +e number argument can be -lled by a numeral, as in (b).
+e plural morpheme on the noun dogs in two dogs is a matter of syntactic agreement
between the noun and the number word. +is agreement is not always realized: for
example Hungarian lacks such an agreement.
() a. [[dog]] = λwλnλx[DOG(w, n, x)]
b. [[two dogs]] = λwλx[DOG(w, , x)]
In addition to the agreement plural present in such forms as two dogs, Krifka assumes
that English also has a semantic plural that is responsible for BPs. +e lexical repre-
sentation associated with BPs is given in (), where the number argument n is le0
unspeci-ed.
() [[dogs]] = λwλx∃n[DOG(w, n, x)]
+us, Krifka introduces a distinction between two types of plural: one is syntactic,
marked by agreement, and the other is semantic, and plays a role in the semantic
composition of bare plurals. Singular count nouns di/er in semantic type from plural
count nouns (which are comparable to mass nouns and nouns with explicit number):
the former are functions fromnumbers to predicates and are of type 〈s,〈n,〈e,t〉〉〉, while
the latter are predicates and are of type 〈s,〈e,t〉〉.
Let us now turn to the semantic composition of bare plurals in the following sen-
tences, where BPs are respectively combined with a kind-selecting predicate, with an
object-selecting predicate in a characterizing sentence, and with an s-level predicate.
() a. Dogs are extinct.
b. Dogs bark.
c. Dogs are barking.
In (a), the predicate is kind-selecting. Since BPs denote properties, there is a type
mismatch. Krifka proposes resolving it via the down operator, which changes the
property into a kind (see (a). +e logical form associated with (a) is given in
 In this introduction, we leave aside the case of mass nouns, and merely note that Krifka assumes that
they lack such a number argument. So a mass noun such as gold has the following lexical representation,
and is of type 〈s,〈e,t〉〉. +us, mass nouns are semantically comparable to count plurals, as in Chierchia
().
() [[gold]] = λwλx[GOLD(w, x)]
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(b). On Chierchia’s account, the semantic composition in this type of sentence is
direct, since BPs denote kinds. However Krifka needs to type-shi0 the subject from
property denotation to kind denotation.
() a. dogs is type-shi0ed into ∩dogs
b. λw BE-EXTINCT (w, ∩dogs)
Krifka claims that in characterizing and existential sentences the type shi0 from prop-
erties to kinds is not motivated by type mismatch, hence, by the last resort principle,
it should not occur.+us he assumes that the BPs in such sentences remain property-
denoting: in characterizing sentences there is a phonologically null generic operator
which establishes a relation between two properties.+e LF associated with (b) is
given in ().
() GEN [∃ndog(n, x)] [bark(x)]
As for existential readings, as illustrated by (c), they can be obtainedwithout chang-
ing the type of the DP.Dogs denotes a property which is applied to an object predicate:
thus there is a type mismatch. But according to Krifka, this mismatch cannot be
resolved by an existential type shi0, since there are overt determiners that allow a
property to turn into an entity: the singular inde-nite a and the plural inde-nite
some. +us, if the last resort principle is true, some should block the application of
type shi0ing and the forms associated with the existential reading should be (a) or
(b) rather that (c), which should not be grammatical.
() a. A dog is barking.
b. Some dogs are barking.
So, to resolve the typemismatch in the case of existential readings, Krifka assumes that
it is theVPwhich type-shi0s, rather than theDP.+is corresponds exactlywithwhat is
proposed by van Geenhoven andDayal in terms of incorporation (see following).+e
VP is changed as in (a) and a0er reduction, the LF associated with (c) is (b).
() a. λwλP ∃x[BE-BARKING(w, x)∧ P(w, x)]
b. λw∃x∃n(BE-BARKING(w, x)∧ DOG (w, n, x))
In sum, Krifka () abandons the ambiguity hypothesis, which he previously
defended for English BPs, and proposes a new analysis according to which BPs always
denote properties that can be either type-shi0ed or incorporated. +e main point
of divergence between Chierchia () and Krifka () concerns their analysis
of number and the relationship between plurality and kind. According to Chierchia,
kinds are only de-ned for plural properties, while forKrifka, no such restriction exists.
+is restriction over kinds permits Chierchia to predict that English bare singulars
are excluded for generic sentences such as (a) or (b). But if this constraint appro-
priately describes the grammar of bare nouns in English, it seems incompatible with
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languages which allow both existential bare singulars and DPs built with an inde-nite
article. In this regard, the case of Brazilian Portuguese constitutes a challenge for
Chierchia’s theory and the hypothesis of the nominal mapping parameter (see Munn
and Schmitt ).
() a. *Dog is extinct.
b. *Dog barks.
On the contrary, according to Krifka, there is no constraint on the down operator: it
is de-ned both for singular and plural properties. For example, he claims that ‘∩[one
dog] is de-ned and stands for an individual concept that maps every world that
has exactly one dog to that dog’ (Krifka, : ). To account for the asymmetry
between bare plurals and bare singulars in English, Krifka assumes the existence of a
semantic plural in English (which is responsible for bare plurals) but denies the exis-
tence of a semantic singular in English. And he restricts the use of the down operator
to true kind predications, i.e. predications made with a kind-selecting predicate.
It is di3cult to -nd empirical arguments that distinguish between Chierchia’s and
Krifka’s proposals. As already mentioned, the main point of divergence is that for
Chierchia, all readings of BPs are derived from a kind reference, which is not the case
for Krifka. Cohen () suggests that if a language could be found in which BPs can-
not denote kinds, but nevertheless occur in characterizing sentences or in existential
sentences, then the conclusion could be drawn that generic and existential readings
of BPs are not derived from kind reference. So such a language would be problematic
for Chierchia, andmay be viewed as arguing for Krifka’s analysis. According to Cohen
(), Italian is precisely a language of this type.
... Property denotation and incorporation +is change of perspective by
Krifka’s change of perspective is partly due to the work of Dayal, who showed that the
ambiguity approach is not tenable for the interpretation of bare nominals in languages
without determiners. She instead proposes an analysis of bare nominals in terms of
incorporation.
.... Existential bare plurals analyzed as a case of semantic incorporation Van
Geenhoven () studied the syntax and semantics of incorporated nouns in West
Greenlandic. She proposed an analysis of these nominals as property-denoting
expressions. +e claim is that incorporated nouns denote neither individuals nor
quanti-ers but rather properties, which combine with verbs and impose restrictions
on the interpretation of their arguments. More precisely, the nominal expression N
restricts the domain of variation of the verbal argument x, as described below. (a)
gives the translation of a transitive verb V, (b) shows how the incorporated noun
(N) combines with the transitive verb (V), and (c) gives the result of the semantic
composition a0er reduction.
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() a. V : λQλx∃y[V(x, y) ∧ Q(y)]
b. V-N : λQλx∃y[V(x, y) ∧ Q(y)] N
c. V-N : λx∃y[V(x, y) ∧ N(y)]
Such an analysis predicts weak readings and narrow-scope e/ects of incorporated
nouns. From the observation that incorporated nouns in West Greenlandic and
English bare plurals share the same semantic properties (narrow scope and weak
reading), van Geenhoven suggests that existential readings of English bare plurals are
the result of semantic incorporation. She thus proposes that English bare plurals in
existential contexts are not kind-denoting but property-denoting.
.... Bare nouns and incorporation In the line of vanGeenhoven, other authors
have been interested in the semantics of incorporation, including Dayal () for
Hindi, Farkas and de Swart () for Hungarian, and Chung and Ladusaw () for
Chamorro. All these authors have focused on languages other than English that allow
not only bare plurals, but also bare singulars.+e challenge is to expand the account
from the semantics of bare plurals to the semantics of bare nouns in general.+e study
of the distribution and interpretation of bare nouns across languages revealed the
importance of number morphology in the analysis of bare nouns. Indeed, it has been
observed that languages which allow both bare singulars and bare plurals place very
di/erent constraints on each: -rst, bare singulars occur in very few contexts and are
usually less productive than bare plurals; and second, bare singulars frequently trigger
number neutrality e/ects.+ese facts require explanation, and seem to co-vary with
whether the language in question morphologically marks number, and whether it has
articles. We will -rst discuss the case of Romance languages, distinguishing Brazilian
Portuguese which presents peculiarities, and then we explore the case of Hindi, which
marks number but has no articles.+e issues to resolve are the following: what is the
denotation of bare singulars and bare plurals in these languages and how are generic
and existential interpretations of bare nouns derived in context? What is the role of
number in interpretation, and how should number neutrality e/ects be explained?
Bare nouns in Romance languages. Espinal () investigates the structure and
meaning of bare nominal expressions inCatalan and Spanish, twoRomance languages
that display both number morphology and articles. Unlike English, these languages
allow both bare singular and bare plural count nominals in internal argument posi-
tion.+is is illustrated in ().
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Bare count nominals are encountered in object position, not only in idiomatic
constructions (Espinal ), but also in non-idiomatic expressions (Laca ).
BSs share three main properties with BPs: obligatory narrow scope, atelicity, and
type anaphora (Espinal and McNally ). But there is an important asymmetry
between BSs and BPs: while object BPs combine unrestrictedly with any class of verbs,
object BSs can only combine with a restricted class of verbs.
To account for this di/erence, Espinal focuses on the role of number in the seman-
tics of nominal expressions. She claims that bare nominals without pluralmorphology
in Catalan and Spanish are not bare singulars (BSs), but rather simple bare nouns
(BNs). Bare nouns in object position (such as cotxe/car in (a)) are not singular,
but unmarked for number. So she distinguishes between three types of nominals:
bare nouns (BNs), number phrases (NumPs) including bare plurals, and determiner
phrases (DPs). Her claim is that BNs in Catalan and Spanish lack both a number
and a determiner. Syntactically, they are unmarked for number and determiner and
therefore cannot be considered canonical arguments. Semantically, they are property-
denoting expressions which modify the transitive verb of which they are an object by
semantic incorporation. Espinal defends the idea that BNswhich do not have inherent
number denote properties of atomic kinds, whereas BPs, which are number phrases,
have a plural interpretation and denote non-atomic sums of individuals that have the
property N. +e denotation of a BN must be contrasted with the denotation corre-
sponding to BPs, but also to singular de-nites and singular inde-nites. According to
Espinal, the presence of number is su3cient to license postverbal plural bare nominals
as internal arguments, and the absence of number in BNs explains the restrictions on
their use in object position.+is and the fact that BNs denote properties of singular
kinds explains why BNs can occur in object position only when the V-N complex
predicate provides a characterizing property of the external subject (e.g., being the
author of a book, being a car owner, a bank account holder, an apartment buyer, awatch-
wearing person). She adds that the absence of number phrase in BNs explains why
they are interpreted as number neutral: BNs denote properties of kinds and convey a
number-neutral interpretation that is compatible with atomic as well as non-atomic
entailments. She shows how a number-neutral reading can lead to either an enriched
singularity or a plural interpretation in appropriate contexts.+e -nal interpretation
depends on the contextual information available.
 +is distribution is unexpected in Chierchia’s () framework, since according to the Nominal
Mapping Parameter, Catalan and Spanish are identi-ed, like all Romance languages, as being of type
[–arg, +pred]. In these languages nouns denote properties rather than individuals and determiner-less
nominals are expected to behave as predicates, not as arguments. Consequently, BNs should not be allowed
in argument position unless a D category is projected (see a.o. Longobardi ).
–––– -Mari-et-al-c-drv Mari-et-al (Typeset by SPi)  of  August ,  :
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF–REVISES, //, SPi
 Alda Mari, Claire Beyssade, and Fabio Del Prete
*e case of Brazilian Portuguese. Among Romance languages, Brazilian Por-
tuguese presents several peculiarities. Brazilian Portuguese has been presented by
Munn and Schmidt as a counter-example to Chierchia’s typology based on the Nomi-
nal Mapping Parameter, because like other Romance languages, Brazilian Portuguese
has de-nite singular and plural kind terms and yet it di/ers from them in admitting
bare singulars as well as bare plurals in generic contexts (see Schmitt and Munn
;Munn and Schmitt ;Müller a,b). Another di/erence betweenBrazilian
Portuguese and other Romance languages is that BSs as well as BPs are acceptable
in subject position. However, bare singulars are ruled out from the preverbal subject
position of episodic sentences, unlike bare plurals (see (a)). Furthermore, it is inter-
esting to note that in (b), the postverbal subject crianca, which is morphologically
singular, is interpreted as number-neutral: the sentence is interpreted as true whether
one or more than one child arrived.





+ere is no consensus on how to analyze the distribution and interpretation of BSs in
Brazilian Portuguese. +e fact that both singular and plural bare nouns in Brazilian
Portuguese obligatorily take narrow scope, as well as the number-neutral readings
associated with bare singulars, can be viewed as evidence that they are incorporated.
But two issues remain open: the issue of generic readings of bare singulars (to the
extent that there is no agreement about the status of bare singulars as kind terms) and
the issue of number-neutral readings.
Semantic Incorporation inHindi orRussian. Languages such asHindi andRussian
display morphological number (like English) but do not have articles (like Chinese).
Dayal provides syntactic and semantic arguments that Hindi exhibits cases of incor-
poration of bare nouns. InHindi, accusativemarking is optional on inanimate objects.
But the situation with animate objects is more nuanced. Case marking is obligatory
if the object has a determiner, as in (a), but optional if there is no determiner.
+e fact that an animate nominal occurs without case marking only when it has no
determiner provides a piece of evidence that non-case-marked animates represent
instances of incorporation. Furthermore, it has been observed that the case-marked
formof an animate object in (b) refers to some particular child, while the unmarked
form refers to one or more children. So, although the nominal is singular, it is inter-
preted as number-neutral. Furthermore, narrow-scope e/ects have been observed
with unmarked forms, which strengthens the idea that bare nouns are sometimes
incorporated in Hindi.
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() a. anu (*har bacca/har bacce-ko) sambhaaltii hai [Hindi]
Anu every child/every child-ACC looks a0er
Anu looks a0er every child.
b. anu bacca/bacce-ko sambhaaltii hai
Anu child/child-ACC looks-a0er
Anu looks a0er (one or more) children/the child.
Languages like Hindi or Russian freely allow bare singular arguments as well as bare
plurals, and both types of bare noun display kind and generic readings. However, bare
singulars are not trivial variants of bare plurals.+e following example from Russian
demonstrates that bare singulars and bare plurals behave di/erently with respect to
scope e/ects.
() a. Sobaka byla vesde
dog SG was SG everywhere
A dog was everywhere.
b. Sobaki byli vesde
dog PL was PL everywhere
Dogs were everywhere.
(a) is strange because it suggests that one and the same dogwas everywhere. Similar
examples can be found in Hindi.
() a. caro taraf baccaa khel rahaa thaa
four ways child SG was playing SG
+e same child was playing everywhere.
b. caro taraf bacce khel rahe the
four ways child PL was playing PL
Children (di/erent ones) were playing in di/erent places
In (a) the bare singular does not have a narrow-scope inde-nite reading. However
the bare plural in a similar context has a plausible narrow-scope inde-nite reading.
Dayal argues that this type of example proves that bare singulars in Hindi as well as
in Russian can have weak inde-nite readings but they cannot be considered bona -de
inde-nites, since they can never take wide scope over other scopal expressions like
everywhere in () and .
+e di/erence between bare singulars and bare plurals can be captured if it is
assumed that the two types of bare nouns provide two di/erent ways to refer to kinds.
Dayal notes that in languages without determiners, bare nominals do double duty
as de-nites and inde-nites, and she suggests that bare singulars in Hindi or Rus-
sian should be compared with de-nite generic NPs like the dog in English, whereas
bare plurals are similar to English bare plurals. According to Dayal, the speci-city
of bare singulars is that they cannot refer non-maximally. +is can be explained if
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bare nominals in languages without determiners are assumed to be only ambiguous
between kinds and de-nites, and not ambiguous between kinds and inde-nites.+e
apparent inde-nite reading of bare nouns arises from the intervention of DKP and
is constrained by morphologically triggered number restrictions. So in this respect,
Dayal follows the analysis of Carlson andChierchia in that she assumes that inde-nite
readings of bare plurals are derived from kind reference via DKP.
Concerning the issue of number-neutral readings of bare singulars, Dayal shows
that in Hindi these readings are always dependent on some aspectual speci-cations
in the sentence. She concludes that they are not derived from the ability of bare nouns
to denote in the plural domain but rather from interactions between bare singulars
with aspectual expressions associated with pluractional operators. She assumes that
number neutrality is not inherent to bare singulars but is a by-product of aspect. So
number neutrality is an e/ect of incorporation: number-neutral readings of incor-
porated nominals are the result of the interaction between a pluractional operator
(responsible, for example, for an iterative reading) and nominal arguments.
To conclude, the various studies mentioned above show that syntactic incorpora-
tion and semantic incorporation may be de-ned and characterized independently.
Semantic incorporation does not rely on a requirement that the incorporated nominal
surface as a morphological or a syntactic unit with the verb. Semantic incorpora-
tion can be identi-ed on the basis of three semantic properties: obligatory narrow
scope, number-neutral readings of singular or unmarked incorporated nominals, and
the ability or inability of incorporated nominals to support discourse anaphora.
Although Dayal’s proposal is in the line of the analysis of incorporating verbs in
Van Geenhoven (), there are nevertheless important di/erences, in particular
concerning the relationship between incorporation and inde-niteness. Van Geen-
hoven wrongly con,ated existential readings of kind terms and incorporation, and
assumed that semantic incorporation can be regarded as a subtheory of inde-nite-
ness. Dayal has shown that Hindi militates against this con,ation, as only non-case-
marked bare singular direct objects, i.e. those that can plausibly be argued to undergo
incorporation, have number-neutral readings. All other bare singulars carry strict
singular implicatures. More generally, she shows that incorporation is independent
from inde-niteness, as she analyzes Hindi bare singulars in generic contexts in terms
of incorporation, and compares them with English de-nite generics. A second point
 We leave aside this aspect of incorporation in this introduction.
 We can -nd the same type of conclusion in Kwon and Zribi-Hertz () on bare objects in Korean,
which presents a descriptive study of Korean ‘bare’ objects.+ey call bare objects those objects which fail
to be su3xed by the marker (l)eul, commonly glossed as an accusative case marker. A systematic survey of
LEUL-marked and bare objects reveals that the latter verify two properties currently regarded as charac-
teristic of semantic incorporation. It appears, however, that although they are semantically incorporated,
Korean bare objects may be fully referential. +e authors are led to assume that the interpretive e/ects of
semantic incorporation may derive from either referential or informational de-ciency, and that these two
types of de-ciency are quite independent from each other. +ey conclude contra Van Geenhoven ()
that semantic incorporation cannot be regarded as a subtheory of inde-niteness.
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which deserves to be highlighted here is that all the studies on bare nouns and
incorporation in various languages have provided a fresh perspective in the debate
over bare nouns and kind reference.+ey have contributed to the emergence of new
areas of exploration, such as the source of number-neutral readings or the role of
number in the building of kind reference. All works on incorporation are presented
as alternatives or complements to Carlson’s thesis, according to which English bare
plurals directly refer to kinds and provide empirical evidence that languages o/er
various ways to refer to kinds. +us distinctions between singular and plural kinds
on the one hand and between direct and indirect kind reference on the other should
be made clear.
.. Varieties of kind-referring DPs
Since Carlson’s (b) paper, the existence of kinds in ontology, as opposed to indi-
viduals, has been widely assumed. But the issue of which linguistic means are used
to refer to kinds deserves attention. Carlson and Chierchia have focused on English
bare plurals. Yet English displays another way of kind-referring, namely the singular
de-nite, as attested by the diagnostic of kind-level predication (see (a) which can
be compared with (b)).
() a. +e dinosaur is extinct.
b. Dinosaurs are extinct.
+e bare plural and the singular de-nite are both kind-referring expressions, but the
latter has been much more studied than the former. Yet both types of nominals are
not in free variation: their behavior di/ers in statements where aspect supports an
episodic interpretation. +e bare plural lends itself to an existential interpretation
((a) means (b)) while the de-nite singular kind term does not ((c) does not
mean (d)). (d) can only be interpreted as a statement about a contextually salient
dog.
() a. Dogs are barking.
b. Some dogs are barking.
c. +e dog is barking.
d. A dog is barking.
So kind-referring de-nite singulars in languages like English are not trivial variants
of kind-referring bare plurals. It follows that any theory of genericity has to account
for the di/erences between singular and plural terms with respect to kind formation.
And if there is a grammatical di/erence between kind-referring bare plurals and
kind-referring de-nite singulars in languages like English, if bare plurals and de-nite
singulars correspond to two di/erent ways of referring to kinds in English, new issues
arise about Romance languages as well as languages without determiners, such as
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Russian or Hindi. First, what are the counterparts of English bare plurals and de-nite
singulars in languages like French and Italian, and are kind-referring de-nite plurals
comparable with English de-nite singulars or with English bare plurals? And second,
in languages without articles, where there is a free type shi0 from properties to kinds
(singular kinds as well as plural kinds), how should we account for kind-referring
bare nouns and for the relationship between number and kind formation? In the last
decade, studies about bare nouns in languages other than English and the relationship
between de-niteness, inde-niteness, and genericity have provided fresh insight into
the issue of kind formation in natural language.+e aimof this subpart is to determine
the semantic contribution of the determiner, of number, and of the noun itself in the
computation of the reference of kind-referring DPs, in a compositional manner. It has
been observed thatmost languages display di/erentmethods of referring to kinds and
use either bare nouns or de-nite noun phrases, but that no language has a speci-c
determiner dedicated to kind formation (see Section ... below). Furthermore,
since Dayal’s () proposal, it has generally been accepted that common nouns are
ambiguous and may denote either a property of individuals, or a property of kind, a
result that predicts the taxonomic uses of DPs, as well as the kind-referring uses of
de-nite singulars (see Section ...). +e issue of the relationship between a kind
and its instances remains to be clari-ed, but we propose a distinction between two
di/erent ways to access kinds: directly, without mentioning the instances of the kind,
and indirectly, by referring to the maximal sum of its instances.
... No speci*c determiner It has been remarked that natural languages generally
do not have speci-c linguistic means to express genericity in the nominal domain:
there is no determiner speci-cally dedicated to the expression of genericity. According
to Dayal, this can be explained by the fact that languages do not lexicalize extensional
vs. intensional distinctions. We have seen that in English, BPs may be used to refer to
kinds. But they give rise to two types of readings (generic or existential) depending
on the context in which they occur (see the contrast between (a) and (b)). So it
cannot be assumed that English bare plurals are dedicated to the reference to kinds.
Moreover, English can use other types of DPs to achieve reference to a kind, as
illustrated by the synonymy between (a) and (c). +us both BPs and singular
de-nites may be used to refer to kinds. Nevertheless, singular de-nites, like BPs, are
not specialized for kind reference and may be used to refer to individuals, as in (d),
where the NP !e son of my neighbors is presuppositional and denotes a particular
man.
() a. Tigers are striped.
b. Mary bought oranges.
c. +e tiger is striped.
d. +e son of my neighbors is blond.
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+e same is true in French, where singular and plural de-nite DPs may sometimes be
used to refer to a kind (see (a) and (b)), and sometimes to ordinary individuals
(as in (c) and (d)).
() a. La baleine est un mammifère.
b. Les hommes sont des bipèdes sans plumes.
c. Le lion est mort dans l’après-midi.
d. Les manifestants ont envahi l’assemblée nationale.
More generally it has been observed that all types of DPs (be they de-nite, inde-nite,
or quanti-ed)may be used to refer to a kind or a subkind, as illustrated in the following
examples. In (a), the lion refers to the species of lions, in (b) the inde-nite DP
refers to a subkind of whales, and (c) and (d) involve quanti-ed DPs (most
mammals, all mammals) which range over subkinds. Examples (b), (c), and (d)
illustrate taxonomic readings in which the noun phrase quanti-es over subkinds of N.
() a. +e lion is a predatory cat.
b. A whale—the blue whale—is becoming extinct.
c. Most mammals belong to the placental group.
d. All mammals are warm-blooded.
... !e noun ambiguity In English, besides bare plurals, singular de-nite DPs
may also refer to kinds. A singular de-nite DP such as the lion is ambiguous and
may refer either to a simple lion or to lion-kind. To account for this ambiguity in
a compositional way, three options are available: either the ambiguity comes from the
determiner, from the noun, or from both of these. One thesis, -rst defended by Dayal
() and (b) and now largely accepted, is that common nouns are ambiguous
and may denote either a property of an individual or a property of a kind. Any
determiner can combine with these two denotations. In the -rst case, composition
yields the familiar reading with a denotation in the object domain; in the second case,
it yields a taxonomic reading with a denotation in the domain of kinds and subkinds
(see ()).
+us the ambiguity of de-nite singulars comes from the noun and not from the
determiner. Once it is assumed that a common noun may denote a property of a
kind, it becomes easy to account for the kind reading of de-nite singulars, as well
as taxonomic readings of inde-nite or quanti-ed noun phrases, such as (b), (c),
and (d). If the noun can denote a property of kind, the simplest way to make
reference to a kind in those languages that have a de-nite determiner is by means
of a singular de-nite. +e noun phrase the lion means ‘the kind called lion’ and the
use of the de-nite determiner is allowed because the presupposition attached to the
de-nite determiner (according which there is one and only one kind called lion) is
satis-ed. And when the kind noun is preceded by an inde-nite determiner or by a
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quanti-er, the role of this determiner is to set o/ one or several subspecies or subkinds
belonging to the species or kind denoted by the noun. In other words, when the noun
whale denotes a property of kind, noun phrases awhale, three whales,most whales, and
all whales denote generalized quanti-ers that are de-ned over subkinds of whales, not
over individual whales. Consequently a whalemeans ‘a subkind of whale’, three whales
means ‘three subkinds of whales’,most mammalsmeans ‘most subkinds of mammals’,
and all mammalsmeans ‘all subkinds of mammals’.
+ere is an important di/erence between kinds and individuals. While individuals
may be structured as a lattice, as shown by Link () and Landman (a,b), kinds
and subkinds are structured as a taxonomy but not as a lattice. Indeed, the plural
object a ⊕ b can be built from two individuals, a and b. Similarly, the plural entity
k ⊕ k can be built from two subkinds k and k, but this plural entity k ⊕ k
may be neither a kind nor a subkind. So there is no lattice built over subkinds and
kinds. But kinds and subkinds are structured as a taxonomy, such that the sum of
all subkinds of N corresponds precisely to the kind N, to the extent that they share
exactly the same instances. So in a sense, when the noun is interpreted as a property
of kind, the two noun phrases the whale and the whales convey the same meaning,
since their denotations cover the same individuals, the same instances. Nevertheless,
a distinction has to be maintained between kinds viewed as entities and kinds viewed
as the sum (or the set) of their instances.When the noun is interpreted as a property of
a kind, it refers to kinds or subkinds viewed as entities, and only indirectly to sums or
sets of instances. We will come back to the di/erence between a kind and its instances
in the next part.
In sum, the ambiguity of de-nite singulars follows from the assumption that com-
mon nouns are ambiguous and may denote properties of kinds. But plural predicates
also are ambiguous. A noun phrase such as lionsmay be analyzed as denoting either
the closure under sum formation of the subkinds of lions, or the closure under sum
formation of individuals which are lions. Consequently, the de-nite plural the lions
may denote either the sum of all subkinds of lions or the sum of all individuals
which are lions.+e choice between these two denotations is determined contextually.
Nevertheless, these two analyses do not provide the same interpretation, since the
sum of subkinds is built from intensional entities, while the sum of individuals is
extensional and de-ned only in the actual world. +is explains why, in a language
like English where bare plurals lexicalize the down operator (see Chierchia  and
Krifka ), bare plurals, whose reference is intensional, are not equivalent with
de-nite plurals, whose reference is extensional when the noun is analyzed as denoting
a property of individuals. +is is di/erent in Romance languages like French and
Italian, where the down operator is lexicalized by the plural de-nite article. In these
languages, de-nite plurals are systematically ambiguous andmay denote either a kind
viewed as an entity or a maximal sum of individuals, which is extensional and de-ned
in the actual world. +us, de-nite singulars in English and Romance languages are
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similar (the noun denotes a property of kind and the de-nite article is the usual iota),
but de-nite plurals in Romance languages are ambiguous, and correspond both to
English bare plurals and English de-nite plurals.
+e noun ambiguity hypothesis provides an explanation of the fact that languages
display various ways to express kind reference: bare plurals and de-nite singulars in
English, or de-nite singulars and de-nite plurals in Romance languages. To account
for the fact that in English as well as in Romance languages, the use of kind-referring
de-nite singulars is more constrained than the use of the other linguistic forms, it is
enough to assume that not all common nouns are able to denote a property of kind. A
de-nite nominal may denote a kind only if the noun itself is able to denote a property
of kind. It has been observed that this is not the case for all nouns. For example,
modi-ed nouns cannot (see (a)), unless they refer to what Krifka et al. ()
called well-established kinds and what Beyssade () called compound nouns or
lexicalizations for French (see (b)).
() a. +e green bottle has a narrow neck.
b. +e coke bottle has a narrow neck.
+e same thing happens with nouns which occupy a high position in the taxon-
omy of kinds and subkinds. For example, while the train or the whale may be kind-
referring in context (see (a) and (b)), it is never the case with the mammal
(see (c)).
() a. +e train is less dangerous than the car.
b. +e whale is a mammal.
c. +e mammal suckles its young.
Various observations have been made on the constraints which restrict the use of
kind-referring de-nite singulars, but no systematic study on this issue has beenmade.
Nevertheless, in the last decade, the issue of relationships between concepts and kinds
has been investigated by cognitivists such as a. o. Gelman, Prasada, and Leslie.
To conclude, there is an observationwhich has yet to be explained in the framework
of the noun ambiguity hypothesis. Englishmass terms, when they refer to kinds, never
occur with a de-nite determiner (see (a) and (b).
() *Man invented the steel.
Yet mass terms belong to taxonomic hierarchies and may receive taxonomic inter-
pretations on a par with count nouns (see for example wine, red wine, white wine).
If the de-nite article encodes the iota operator and freely applies to the taxonomic
domain, one would expect it to occur with mass terms as well as with count nouns.
Chierchia () accounts for bare uses of mass nouns by assuming that mass nouns
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are semantically plural and are built with the down operator. In fact, he predicts that
mass nouns may occur bare, but he does not predict that they cannot occur with a
de-nite determiner. An answer could be that mass nouns, unlike count nouns, are
not predicates (i.e. words denoting a property of an individual or a property of a
kind), but they could be basically kind-denoting. +ey would be similar to proper
names and would thus not require a determiner when used in argument position.We
will not develop this idea here as it brings up the issue of the count-mass distinction
and the semantics of mass nouns, which is beyond our present purpose, centered on
genericity and kind reference.
... Direct and indirect reference to kind From the noun ambiguity hypothesis,
it follows that natural languages display at least two di/erent ways to form kind-
referring terms:
• by applying the down operator to a plural property, as suggested by Chierchia
()
• by applying the iota operator to a singular noun which denotes a property of
kind.
+ese two ways to refer to kinds di/er in two respects: the former involves a plural
noun which refers to a property of an object while the latter involves a singular noun
which refers to a property of kind; moreover, the former uses the down operator while
the latter uses the iota operator. To distinguish between these two modes of kind
formation, Dayal () calls ‘plural kinds’ the kind terms built with plural nouns
and the down operator and ‘singular kinds’ the kind terms built with a singular noun
and the iota operator.
In English, the -rst way corresponds to bare plurals, and the second to de-nite
singulars. It has been claimed that in Romance languages, the de-nite singular article
lexicalizes the iota operator and the de-nite plural article lexicalizes the down oper-
ator. And Dayal suggests that in languages without determiners such as Russian or
Hindi, bare singular nouns illustrate the second type of kind formation, i.e. singular
kind formation.
We have seen that singular and plural kind terms are not trivial variants. In English,
bare plurals (BPs) and de-nite singulars (DSs) di/er in frequency and distribution.
DSs are more limited than BPs in generic sentences.
• DSs are limited to well-established kinds (Krifka et al. ), i.e. natural kinds
such as the lion and concepts such as the sonnet (Carlson )
• DSs are excluded for human categories (such as the lawyer or the piano player)
• DSs are excluded for overly general terms (such as the parabola or the curve) (see
Vendler )
Similar observations have beenmade concerning the contrast between de-nite singu-
lars and de-nite plurals in French. Beyssade () focuses on generic uses of French
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de-nite DPs and accounts for cases where singular and plural DPs are not equivalent.
+e claim is that in French, generic de-nite singularDPs involve a nounwhich denotes
a property of kind, as in English. As for generic plural de-nite DPs, instead of being
interpreted as referring to the maximal sum of entities in the actual world, they are
interpreted as referring to themaximal sum of entities in anyworld: the plural de-nite
determiner may be viewed as the lexicalization of the down operator.
Dayal claims that singular kinds di/er from plural kinds in not having a semanti-
cally transparent relation to their instantiations. She observes that in languages with
number marking but no determiners (like Hindi or Russian), bare plurals behave
more or less like English bare plurals, but bare singulars are substantively di/erent. She
claims that what distinguishes singular kind terms from plural kind terms is the way
they relate to their instantiations. An analogy can be drawn with what distinguishes
collective nouns like the team and plural nouns like the players. Barker () and
Schwarzschild () have argued that collective nouns di/er from plural nouns in
being group-like rather that sum-like: collective nouns like the team must be repre-
sented as groups, which are atomic entities with no access to their parts, while nouns
like the players correspond to a sum of individuals, whose atomic parts are available
for predication.+e following examples illustrate this di/erence between groups and
sums.
() a. +e players live in di/erent cities.
b. *+e team lives in di/erent cities.
Following thework ofChierchia () which rules out bare singular kinds in English,
Dayal assumes that the down operator applies only to plural nouns and yields a kind
term that allows semantic access to its instantiations, analogously to sums. Singular
kind terms restrict such access and to this extent are analogous to collective nouns.
Like groups and sums, singular and plural kinds are conceptually associated with
the same set of entities, but di/er in their relation to these entities. We will say
that singular kind terms directly refer to kinds, while plural kinds terms only refer
indirectly, because the plural indicates the trace of a reference to the instances of
the kind.
For the moment, we have only compared bare plurals and de-nite singulars in
English and de-nite plurals vs de-nite singulars in French. But in order to give a better
description of kind-referring noun phrases at least in English, we have expanded the
picture to include de-nite plurals. Condoravdi (, ) has shown that there
are contexts in English in which bare plurals and de-nite plurals convey the same
meaning (see (a) and (b)). According to Condoravdi, the bare plural students
in (a) is not existential, since (a) doesn’t mean (c). But students isn’t generic
either, because it is not lawlike. She concludes that besides the generic and existential
readings of English bare plurals, there is a third reading of bare plurals, which she
calls the functional reading, which corresponds precisely to situations where bare
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plurals and de-nite plurals seem to converge. According to her, the bare plural in
(a) conveys a quasi-universal reading.
() a. In  there was a ghost haunting the campus. Students were afraid.
b. In  there was a ghost haunting the campus.+e students were afraid.
c. In  there was a ghost haunting the campus. +ere were students who
were afraid.
Condoravdi adopts a very radical position, since she considers that English bare
plurals are compatible with not two, but three di/erent readings.+is claim is debated
in the literature and it seems possible to analyze Condoravdi’s examples as a sub-
case of generic readings, called restricted generics by Drewery (). Nevertheless
Condoravdi’s data show that in languages which have both bare nouns and de-nite
determiners, it is important to compare the uses and interpretations of these two
forms in order to determine whether and how each language lexicalizes the down
operator. Schaden’s paper in this volume addresses the issue in German and accounts
for the di/erences between BPs and de-nite plurals. Several dimensions are relevant
in the characterization of the di/erences: one can refer to a kind either via its extension
(i.e the set of all of its members) or via its intension (i.e. the set of the characteristic
properties of the kind); one can refer to all the actual instances of a kind, or to a kind
as an abstract entity.
... Conclusion It is commonly accepted that reference is not only limited to
individuals or pluralities but also to kinds. +e most convincing evidence for kind
reference comes from the existence of kind-level predicates such as be extinct. We
have shown that in every attested language, kind terms are either bare or occur
with the de-nite determiner. Furthermore, languages o0en display several ways
to express kind reference. +e presence or absence of number morphology seems
to play a crucial role in kind formation and in the way a kind is related to its
instances. Recent works in psychology concerning generics (e.g., Gelman ;
Gelman and Bloom ; Prasada et al. ; Prasada ; Leslie ; Leslie
et al. ) o/er a new perspective concerning linguistic studies on genericity.
+ese studies test the empirical validity of theoretical proposals concerning the
logical form of generic sentences. For example, to discriminate the neo-Carlsonian
approaches, which claim that existential readings of English bare plurals derive
from kind-referring denotations, from the ambiguity approach, it would be useful
to test the validity of basic contrasts concerning the scope of generic NPs. In this
volume, Le Bruyn et al.’s paper presents some initial results which seem to invalidate
the scope contrasts invoked by Carlson and the neo-Carlsonians. Empirical studies
could also be made in order to establish a complete description of di/erences in
distribution between BPs, inde-nite DPs, and de-nite DPs that contribute to generic
sentences. And -nally, the issue of relationships between concepts and kinds, recently
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investigated by cognitivists, remains to be clearly articulated in the theoretical
literature on generics.
. Genericity and the VP
We now turn to the relation between genericity and the VP. Section .. focuses on
the distinction between stage-level and individual-level predicates, which, in Carl-
sonian terms, describe, respectively, stages of an individual and individuals them-
selves. At the time of !e Generic Book, two assumptions were made. First, it was
assumed that these predicates have di/erent logical forms. Notably, stage-level pred-
icates involve an event argument (Kratzer ). Alternately (Chierchia ), both
types of predicateswere viewed as involving a situation argument, but only individual-
level predicates were considered to enter the logical form with a generic operator that
binds the situation argument inducing the e/ect of permanency, which is character-
istic of individual-level predicates. We will show how both di/erences in logical form
have been abandoned, and how individual-level readings of predicates are no longer
considered to be an e/ect of a hidden generic operator.
Section .. addresses the related question of the role played by unboundedness
and plurality in the generic interpretation. It concludes that sentences with overt
quanti-cational adverbs are to be distinguished from the generic reading of sentences
without overt adverbs. +is argues for entirely reconsidering the view according to
which genericity is a consequence of a hidden generic and/or habitual operator.
Section .. addresses the question of the dispositional reading of generic sen-
tences according to which generic sentences involve a hidden abilitative opera-
tor can. Here again, contrasting the available interpretations of overt and covert




.... +e conceptual distinction In , Milsark established a distinction
between state descriptive and property descriptive predicates. Milsark’s distinction is
essentially temporal: property predicates permanently characterize an entity, whereas
state-level predicates denote non-permanent, or accidental properties. In Milsark’s
terms (Milsark : ):
. . . states are conditions in which an entity -nds itself and which are subject to change without
there being an essential alteration of the entity . . . [Properties] are descriptions which name
some trait possessed by the entity and which is assumed to be more or less permanent or at
least to be such that some signi-cant change in the character of the entity will result if the
description is altered . . .
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Carlson (b) uses the terms stage-level and individual-level predicates (SLP/ILP),
which correspond to, respectively, the state-level and the property predicates of Mil-
sark.+e major novelty of Carlson’s view is that the distinction is explicitly stated to
correspond to the ontological di/erence between the domains onwhich the predicates
operate. Stage-level predicates operate on the domain of stages of individuals and
individual-level predicates operate on the individuals themselves. In Carlson’s terms
(Carlson : ):
. . . [+e ILP/SLP] distinction is correlated with the sort of entity the predicate meaningfully
applies to. If the predicate speaks of general characteristics, or dispositions, we represent it as
applying to a set of objects. If something more ,eeting is intended, somehow more temporary,
and in some sense less intrinsic to the nature of a given individual, the predicate is represented
as denoting a set of stages.+is distinction is intended to correspond to the basically atemporal
nature of individuals as opposed to their time-bound stages . . .
Carlson’s distinction between two types of domains has seen greater popularity in the
subsequent syntactic and semantic literature on SLP-ILP, as the issue of the lexical,
logical, and conceptual representation of the predicates is overtly raised by assuming
that their domains contain either stages of individuals or individuals themselves. At
the lexical and logical level, the question arises as to how this distinction emerges in
the grammar and how it must be coded in the logical form.
.... +e conceptual distinction in the grammatical realm +e conceptual dis-
tinction between SLP and ILP is re,ected in grammatical distinctions. In particu-
lar, bare plural subjects have an existential interpretation with SLPs only ((a) vs
(b)).
() a. Firemen are available. (existential reading possible)
b. Firemen are altruistic.
Only SLPs can be used in the ‘there’-coda ((a) vs (a)).
() a. +ere were men naked.
b. *+ere were men blond.
Only SLPs can combine with locative modi-ers ((a) vs (b)), be complements of
perception verbs ((a) vs (b)), and be used as depictives ((a) vs (b)).
() a. Maria was friendly in the car.
b. *Maria was tall in the car.
() a. Maria saw Susan sick.
b. *Maria saw Susan tall.
() a. Maria sat tired in the waiting room.
b. *Maria sat blond in the waiting room.
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+e question thus arises as to how to interpret these facts, and what are the logical
forms.
.... +e conceptual distinction implemented In view of these facts, Chierchia
() argues that ILPs are intrinsically generic. Chierchia posits a GEN operator
which quanti-es over spatio-temporally bounded situations.
According to the dyadic quanti-er analysis (e.g. Krifka et al. ), GEN is analyzed
as a tripartite quanti-cational structure, consisting of a quanti-er, a restrictive clause
and a nuclear scope; see ():
() GEN [restrictor] [matrix]
GEN is an unselective quanti-er à la Lewis (), that can bind any free variable.
For clarity, for the rest of the introduction we specify the variable over which GEN
quanti-es for each of the cases discussed.
According to the analysis proposed inChierchia, a sentence like (a) is analyzed as
in (b). Here C is a free variable for ‘contextually relevant situations’. GEN quanti-es
over such relevant situations, and in all these relevant situations John is intelligent.
+e permanent character of the predicate intelligent is captured via the generic quan-
ti-cation on all relevant situations that involve John. Relevant situations are those
situations that require ‘intelligence’.
() a. John is intelligent.
b. GEN s [C(john,s)] [intelligent(john,s)]
In section (...) we propose an alternative view, which interprets the lack of spatio-
temporal localization of ILP properties in terms of property unboundedness, and
considers the latter as a source of the generic interpretation (rather than positing a
hidden quanti-er GEN).
!e Generic Book also addressed the question of the lexical representation of these
predicates, a question to which Kratzer’s paper (Kratzer ) provides an answer
which has been the focus of much debate in the subsequent years. Adopting a David-
sonian view according to which only eventive predicates have an event argument
(whereas stative predicates do not), the distinction between SLPs and ILPs was rein-
terpreted as cutting across events and states: states were considered to be ILPs and
events to be SLPs (although it was very quickly noted that some states are also SLPs,
like ‘be drunk’, see discussion in Fernald  and below). +is distinction was thus
implemented in terms of the presence or absence of an event argument in the logical
form of SLP and ILP sentences.
Kratzer assumes that generic sentences (more precisely, characterizing sentences)
are to be analyzed as tripartite structures, as in (). Speci-cally for characteriz-
ing sentences with a singular inde-nite, along the lines of Heim (), the author
assumes that a free variable is introduced in the LF by the inde-nite. +e analysis
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of sentence (a) is given in (b), in which a silent generic quanti-er translated as
‘always’ in the LF is provided.
() a. When a Moroccan knows French, she knows it well. (Kratzer : )
b. Always x [Moroccan (x) ∧ know French (x)] [know well (x)]
Kratzer notes the ungrammaticality of ().
() *When Mary knows French, she knows it well.
+e problem here is that when the characterizing sentence does not involve an inde--
nite DP, the quanti-er has no variable to bind in its scope. Within this framework the
ungrammaticality of () is accounted for by appealing to the principle of prohibition
agains vacuous quanti-cation (), given in Kratzer (: ).
() For every quanti-er Q, there must be a variable x such that Q binds an occur-
rence of x in both its restrictive clause and its nuclear scope.
In () there is no variable that the quanti-er could bind in both the restrictive clause
and the nuclear scope, and thus the sentence is predicted to be ungrammatical.
Remarkably, acceptability is restored if know French is replaced with speak French,
as in ().
() When Mary speaks French, she speaks French well.
+e contrast between () and () is explained by assuming that SLPs (like speak)
have an additional Davidsonian argument.+is argument provides a variable for the
spatio-temporal location of the eventuality that the predicate speak describes. Along
the lines of Davidson, this argument is missing for ILPs. +e resulting LF for () is
given in ().
() Always s [speak (Mary, French, s) ] [speak -well (Mary, French, s)]
... ILP/SLP in the recent semantic debate In pursuing the line of research initi-
ated by Kratzer’s paper, the debate around ILP and SLP has become part of the debate
on events (considered as SLPs) and states (considered as ILPs), which has focused on
establishing whether and to what extent the correlation initiated by Kratzer (shown
in ()) holds.
() +e view of SLP/ILP at the time of!e Generic Book
ILP statives no event argument
SLP eventives event argument
.... Revisitation of the twofold distinction: ILP statives It is easy to note that
the correlation between ILPs and states does not always go through as there are
SLP states, like ‘be on the boat’, etc. (see Fernald ). Reconsidering the twofold
distinction between ILPs and SLPs, Jäger () has identi-ed multiple classes based
–––– -Mari-et-al-c-drv Mari-et-al (Typeset by SPi)  of  August ,  :
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF–REVISES, //, SPi
Introduction 
on consideration of three features. +e -rst is () the ability to obtain an existential
readingwith bare plural subjects. In the table that follows, we posit that a predicate has
a feature [WS] if and only if it admits an existential reading of the subject.+e second
feature () pertains to the ability to occur as the in-nite complement of a perception
verb. If the predicate concerned has this ability, the feature [PR] is used.+irdly (),
if the predicate denotes a transitory property, the feature [TR] is used. By combining
these three features, eight classes are identi-ed.
[WS] [PR] [TR] Example Type of eventuality
A + + + shout, hear eventive
B + + − stand, sit, lie eventive
C + − + available eventive
D + − − situated at this river eventive
E − + + naked, drunk, sick eventive
F − + − to tower over eventive
G − − + love, hate, know states
H − − − to have blue eyes statives
+e split between classes G and H is particularly important, since it points to the fact
that the class of so-called ‘states’ needs to be further re-ned. However, this re-nement
is not visible in the logical form, as Jäger () assumes that all predicates have an
event argument. In particular, he argues that the Davidsonian argument of statives
ranges over time slices of possible worlds, and that these cannot be the object of
perception.
.... In defense of the Davidsonian view Katz () is a true defender of the
Davidsonian view, which claims that only eventives are equipped with an event argu-
ment.+is view contrasts with the neo-Davidsonian view (Parsons ), according
to which all predicates, eventives and statives, are equipped with an event argument.
Katz, unlike Jäger () does not tease apart states from statives. He simply uses
the label ‘statives’ for verbs both like love, know (Jäger’s class G) and have blue eyes
(Jäger’s class H).
Focusing on adverb modi-cation, he argues that statives should not be treated on a
par with eventives. His well-known argument is based on the distribution of adverbs
(see e.g. Katz , , ). Along with Jackendo/ (), Katz () observes
that there are two types of adverbs: S-Adverbs that combine at the sentence level
and modify propositions (), and VP-adverbs that combine at the VP level and are
predicate modi-ers ().
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() a. John probably loved Mary.
b. John probably kissed Mary.
() a. *John loved Mary quickly.
b. John kissed Mary quickly.
Katz further notes that while S-adverbs can combine with both eventive (b) and
stative predicates (a), the latter type can only combine with events (b) and
not with statives (a). He further observes that there are no VP adverbs that can
combine with states/statives but not with events. He calls this phenomenon ‘stative
adverb gap’.
According to the author, this shows that statives are not equipped with an event
argument. +e reasoning goes as follows. According to the neo-Davidsonians (i.e.
on the assumption that all predicates, including statives have an event argument),
verbs (a) and VP adverbs (b) denote predicates of eventualities. VP-adverbial
modi-cation is thus simple conjunction, as illustrated in the following derivation
(Katz, : ) (‘<’ indicates temporal precedence).
() a. John leave λe[leave(e, John)]
b. slowly λPλe[P(e)&slow(e)]
c. John le0 slowly ∃e[leave(e,John) & slow(e) & e < now]
+e conclusion follows that if states were equipped with an event argument, the
derivation should go through and (a) would have to be acceptable, contrary to fact.
+e picture is thus identical to that earlier proposed by Kratzer ().
.... Kimian states As mentioned, neo-Davidsonians, and more precisely, Par-
sonians (Parsons ), argue instead that all eventualities (i.e. events and states,
see Bach ) are equipped with an event argument (see e.g. Dölling ; Hig-
ginbotham ; Rothstein ). Followers of this view give up the assumption
that eventualities are located in space and suggest, for instance, that ‘eventualities are
abstract entities with constitutive participants and with a constitutive relation to the
temporal dimension’ (Ramchand, : ).
In this framework, various authors have noted that statives can be modi-ed by
adverbs.
() a. John was a Catholic with great passion in his youth. (Jäger )
b. Dan is in the country illegally. (Mittwoch )
c. +e board is coarsely grooved. (Parsons )
(Maienborn , , , ) defends the idea that adverb modi-cation can
occur with statives at the price of a coercion of the predicate from stative to eventive.
She argues that (a) should be interpreted as describing a passionate way of John
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living his Catholicism. Maienborn thus proposes considering statives as Kimian
states (Kim , ).
() Kimian states: K-states are abstract objects for the exempli-cation of a property
P at a holder x and a time t.
Maienborn identi-es someontological properties ofKimian states and some linguistic
diagnostics.
() Ontological properties
a. K-states are not accessible to direct perception and have no location in space
b. K-states are accessible to (higher) cognitive operations
c. K-states can be located in time
() Linguistic diagnostics
a. K-states expressions cannot serve as in-nitival complements of perception
verbs and do not combine with locative modi-ers (a)
b. K-states are accessible for anaphoric reference (b)
c. K-states can combine with temporal modi-ers (c)

























In recentwork, Rothmayr () has argued thatDavidsonian events are derived from
Kimian states.+is is discussed by Moltmann, in the present volume, in her research
dealing with states, statives, and Kimian states.
... ILP/SLP in the recent pragmatic debate In a recent paper, Magri ()
proposes a pragmatic view of the distinction between SLP and ILP predicates.
Following Chierchia (), he recognizes that there are di/erences between the
two types of predicates that surface in the grammar (he acknowledges the distinc-
tions provided, in ()–()). However, Magri claims that there is no di/erence at
the level of the logical form (in particular, all types of eventualities, statives, and
eventives are equipped with an event argument), and that the grammatical di/er-
ences are predicted on the basis of calculation of inferences that appeal to common
knowledge.
As for the predicate tall, the ILP interpretation is calculated in the following way.
If we look at the entire set of possible worlds, there is no di/erence between ILPs like
 Maienborn subscribes to the distinction between states and statives and assumes that the latter only
are to be treated separately.
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tall and SLPs like available.+ere are worlds in which John is available only at some
times in his lifespan and there are also worlds in which John is tall only at some times
in his lifespan.
+e di/erence between the two categories emerges as soon as we restrict ourselves
to consideration of worlds compatible with common knowledge. Magri argues that
there are indeed worlds compatible with common knowledge where John is available
only at some times in his lifespan, whereas there are no worlds compatible with
common knowledge where John is tall only at some times in his life.
Magri () formulates the assumption ():
() +ere is no world compatible with common knowledge [. . . ] where John hap-
pens to be tall at some times in his life only but not at some others.
As a generalization,Magri states a rule for what he calls the ‘homogeneous’ predicates.
() A predicate is homogeneous w.r.t. a Restrictor if and only if there is no world
compatible with common knowledge where some elements in the Restrictor
satisfy the Predicate and some others don’t (i.e. () (Magri, : ) is not




For the predicate be tall, the Restrictor part contains the times at which John is alive.
+e Predicate part contains the times at which John is tall.
Magri considers various cases, including the following contrast ():
() a. ??John is sometimes tall.
b. John is sometimes available.
By calculation of the implicatures associated with homogeneous predicates, Magri
explain the oddness of (a) in the following manner.
() a. Because of the existential Q-adverb, (a) triggers the scalar implicature that
John is not always tall
b. But common knowledge entails that, if John is sometimes tall, then he must
always be tall by assumption ()
c. +e oddness of (a) thus follows from the mismatch between the implica-
ture (a) and the common knowledge (b)
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Magri captures the ILP/SLP distinction within a broader perspective that includes
other cases like (). Its oddness is explained by the reasoning in () that parallels
that in ().
() ?? Some Italians come from a wonderful country.
() a. +e use of some triggers the scalar implicature that not all Italians come from
a wonderful country
b. But common knowledge entails that all Italians come from the same country
(which is here described as wonderful) ()
c. +e oddness of () thus follows from themismatch between the implicature
and the common knowledge
Magri’s theory thus extends to a variety of cases beyond genericity, and sheds a
new light on the nature of ILPs, which are explained within a more general the-
ory of homogeneous predicates and calculation of implicatures associated with such
predicates.
.... Summary To conclude, the table below summarizes the developments that
the foundational twofold distinction has undergone in the debate that !e Generic
Book has initiated.
Author Stative/eventive ILP/SLP Event argument
Kratzer/Katz Stative ILP No
Eventive SLP Yes
Jäger Eventives (classes A–F) SLP Yes
States (class G) SLP Yes
Statives (class H) ILP Yes
Maienborn Eventives (not at issue) Yes
Kimian states (not at issue) No
Magri Eventives/Statives ILP/SLP Yes
.. Unboundedness and plurality
... Unboundedness
.... Unboundedness in!e Generic Book and before A property of character-
izing sentences which has o0en been regarded as essential to their generic meaning is
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temporal unboundedness, namely the property by which such a sentence is not true
relative to a time interval with de-nite bounds, but rather relative to an inde-nitely
large interval, or even in a timeless way. +e relevant observation has been that
generics cannot be felicitously modi-ed by adverbs denoting particular temporal
locations, unlike sentences that report singular episodes, as illustrated by the contrast
in acceptability between () and () (a question mark before a sentence indicates
oddness):
() Dogs were barking at  pm.
() ?Dogs bark today.
Temporal unboundedness is intuitively related to the law-like or nomic character of
generics (Dahl ), another property that has been considered essential to such sen-
tences. Laws indeed do not refer to singular events but rather express regular patterns
of occurrence of certain types of events; as such, their truth is not relative to bounded
time intervals, unlike the truth of sentences reporting singular events. For the sake
of precision, and to avoid misunderstanding, we should note that the particular type
of generic meaning called reference to a kind in Krifka et al. (: ), which consists
of kind-referring DPs, is in fact compatible with predications specifying a temporal
localization, as shown by () and ():
() Potatoes were imported to Europe at the end of the XVI century.
() +e dodo became extinct in the late XVII century.
Such sentences, however, should be disregarded as irrelevant: they involve kind-
referring DPs in subject position (the bare plural potatoes and the singular de-nite
the dodo) and report particular episodes concerning the kinds referred to, where the
episodes in question can be naturally ascribed a bounded temporal location; it is
indeed these episodes which are ascribed a temporal location in () and () by the
use of time adverbials.+us, the temporal location in () and () does not provide
a case against temporal unboundedness as a characterizing feature of genericity. In
passing, we should also note that unboundedness is arguably a characterizing fea-
ture of generically interpreted DPs as well, as shown by the contrast in acceptability
between (a) and (b) (from Carlson ):
() a. Desks that have metal tops are increasingly rare. (= Carlson’s [b])
b. ?Desks that Bill is looking at right now are increasingly rare. (= Carlson’s
[b])
On the one hand, the relative clause in the bare plural subject of (a) expresses the
general property of having metal tops, through which the kind desks can be restricted
 Here we do not concern ourselves with spatial unboundedness, which has also been claimed to be
characteristic of genericity.
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to a particular subkind, i.e. desks that have metal tops. In (b), on the other hand, the
relative clause in the bare plural subject refers to a particular episode which is located
at the time of utterance by the temporal adverbial right now.+e introduction of such
temporal bounds is incompatiblewith the subjectDPbeing interpreted generically, i.e.
as a kind-referring DP. Given that the predicate of (b) can be meaningfully applied
only to kind-referring subjects, and given further that the subject of (b) fails to
refer to any kind, the sentence turns out to be unacceptable. We thus seem entitled to
conclude that generic DPs too require unboundedness.
+e importance that has been attached to unboundedness as an essential prop-
erty of generics is apparent by considering Chierchia’s () arguments for clas-
sifying individual-level predicates (ILPs) as inherent generics. +e empirical evi-
dence on which Chierchia bases his view crucially incorporates the property of non-
localizability displayed by predicates like be French, as opposed to episodic predicates
like be tired. Note the contrast in acceptability between () and (), which is strictly
parallel to the contrast considered at the outset between () and ().
() Jean was tired this morning.
() ?Jean is French today.
Chierchia’s point is that an ILP predicate like ‘be French’ contributes a type of property
predication to the sentence meaning which does not allow for temporal restrictions,
and thus patterns with generic predications like () above.We consider several ques-
tions in the following sections, including: how is the unboundedness property that
scholars have recognized both in generics and in ILPs to be properly understood?How
essential is the role that unboundedness plays in the emergence of generic readings? Is
unboundedness a su3cient factor for an account of howgenericmeaning is generated,
or must we invoke a generic operator or quanti-er of some sort to make such an
account work?
.... Unboundedness as an e/ect of a generic operator Webegin by considering
what can be fairly seen as the most common view about characterizing sentences,
i.e. the idea that their generic meaning is obtained as the e/ect of an underlying
operator or quanti-er which is not phonologically realized but which is still active in
the composition of the sentence meaning. On this view, the unboundedness property
of generics, if considered at all, is taken as an e/ect of the underlying operator. To
cite just a few representative examples of this view, Lawler (), Carlson (b),
Farkas and Sugioka (), Heim (), and most of the contributions in Carlson
and Pelletier () all proposed accounts of generics based on such covert operators
or quanti-ers. Much of the evidence for these proposals came from the interpretation
of English simple present tense sentences with dynamic predicates, like ():
() Mary smokes.
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Such sentences cannot be interpreted as reporting one single episode of the type
described by the verb (unlike English progressive sentences), but can only be inter-
preted as generalizations over episodes of that type. +e common idea pursued by
these authors is that the generalization in question is e/ected through a syntactically
covert operator, which in some proposals operates at the level of the verb phrase,
thus deriving an individual-level predicate from a basic stage-level predicate (Carlson
b), while in some others operates at the level of the sentence (Farkas and Sugioka
; Heim ; Carlson and Pelletier ), where it acts as a dyadic generic quan-
ti-er with syntactic and semantic properties similar to the ones of the quanti-cational
adverb always.
To illustrate the di/erence between these two types of analysis, we consider what
logical forms are predicted by each for the sentence (). According to Carlson
(b), () is analyzed as a simple subject-predicate structure in which the subject
DPMary refers to the individualMary herself, as opposed to any temporally bounded
stage of this individual (e.g. the temporally bounded stage ofMary consisting ofMary
smoking a cigarette on a particular occasion), and the episodic or stage-level verb
smokes is shi0ed to an individual-level predicate via a monadic operator Gn, whose
semantic contribution is constrained as follows (here, xo and xs are sorted variables
which range over objects and stages respectively). Where P is a stage-level predicate,
e.g. P = λxs. smoke′ (xs), applying Gn to the intension of P yields the object-level
predicate Gn(∧P) = λxo. [Gn(∧λxs.smoke′(xs))](xo). If a sentence S is translated as
[Gn(∧λxs.P′(xs))](xo), the truth of S requires that there be stages of the object xo
which have the property λxs.P′(xs).
Sentence () is translated as the formula (), whose intuitive interpretation is
given by the paraphrase below:
() [Gn (∧λxs.smoke′(xs))](Mary)
+e individual Mary has the property of generally or habitually smoking.
By the semantics of Gn given above, no requirement on the number of episodes in
which Mary smokes is imposed by the truth of the predication that Mary habitually
smokes—the only requirement is that there has been at least one such episode. While
this might well appear too weak for the example at hand, this weakness was meant to
account for the great variability in ‘quanti-cational force’ of habituals, which has been
recognized since Lawler (). Carlson’s idea was that a speci-cation of the number
of episodes which should be necessary for the truth of a habitual sentence cannot
be the business for a semantic theory of generics but must be le0 to extra-semantic
considerations.
According to the dyadic quanti-er analysis (e.g. Krifka et al. ), () is to be
analyzed as a tripartite quanti-cational structure of the formGEN(restrictor; matrix),
as in ():
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() GENs [s is suitable for Mary smoking] [ Mary smokes in s]
All/most possible situations s which are suitable for Mary smoking are such
that Mary indeed smokes in s.
Here GEN only binds a situation variable, the restrictor, i.e. the property of being a
situation suitable forMary smoking is a contextually supplied property that constrains
the domain of GEN, and thematrix is the property of being a situation in whichMary
smokes. Since it is treated as an unselective quanti-er (see ()), in other cases GEN
may bind individual variables as well, e.g. when inde-nite DPs occur in the restrictor,
as in the sentence (), whose logical representation is given in ():
() A cat has a tail.
() GEN x, s [x is a cat in s] [x has a tail in s]
All normal individuals x and situations s such that x is a cat in s are such that
x has a tail in s.
+ere are di/erences between the account based on the VP-level monadic operator
and the one based on the dyadic operator, discussed by Carlson () and Krifka
et al. (), who both take the latter to be superior. One phenomenon that has
played a crucial role in determining the switch fromCarlson’smonadic operator to the
dyadic operatorGEN is the ambiguity of ().+is sentence has two di/erent generic
readings. On one reading (referred to as ‘Reading ’ below), the sentence means that
hurricanes in general have the property of arising in that part of the Paci-c which is
demonstratively referred to, and on this reading the sentence is false. On the other
reading (reported as ‘Reading ’ below), which corresponds to a prosodic pattern
where focus is placed on hurricanes, the sentence means that there are hurricanes
that arise in the part of the Paci-c referred to, and on this reading the sentence is true.
() Hurricanes arise in this part of the Paci-c.
Reading : ‘In general hurricanes arise in this part of the Paci-c.’
Reading : ‘+is part of the Paci-c is such that there are hurricanes that arise
in it.’
Carlson’s original theory is not equipped to dealwith e/ects of prosody on logical form
and only predicts the reading of () in which the BP subject is interpreted generi-
cally, with thewhole sentence reporting a property of the kind hurricanes (Reading ).
+is reading, which corresponds to the normal out-of-the-blue intonation of (),
is captured by the following analysis:
() [Gn(∧λxs.arise-in-this-part-of-Paci-c(xs))](hurricanes)
+e problematic reading of (), i.e. Reading , would be captured by having the DP
this part of the Paci*c come out as the logical subject of the sentence and by having its
surface position abstracted over by a λ operator, thus generating the logical predicate
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λxs.hurricanes arise in xs. +e latter is fully translated as λxs.∃ys[R(ys, hurricanes)
∧ arise-in(ys, xs)]. +is stage-level predicate would then be shi0ed to an individual-
level predicate via the Gn operator before being applied to the logical subject. +e
-nal result would be the following formal analysis, given along with an informal
paraphrase:
() [Gn(∧λxs.∃ys[R(ys, hurricanes)∧arise-in(ys, xs)])](this part of the Paci-c)
+is part of the Paci-c has the property of generally having hurricanes arising
in it.
+is analysis, however, is out of reach of Carlson’s original theory. +e theory based
on the dyadic operator, on the other hand, can naturally handle focus and e/ects of
prosody on meaning, so it can easily account for the problematic reading of ()
once it is supplemented with the standard assumption that focused material goes in
the nuclear scope (see the Standard Prosodic Hypothesis of Asher and Pelletier, this
volume).+us the logical form of () will be as follows:
() GENs [s is suitable for something arising in this part of the Paci-c] [there are
hurricanes that arise in this part of the Paci-c in s]
+e formal accounts that we have considered thus far converge on the idea that
generic interpretations result from an underlying generic operator, the semantics
of which has been thought of either in terms of an aspectual shi0 from stage-level
interpretations to individual-level interpretations of verbal predicates, or in terms of
a (quasi) universal quanti-cation over situations/individuals. We want to emphasize
that the proponents of such operator-based accounts have also generally recognized
the importance of a notion of unboundedness for a theory of genericity, at least for
the sake of a descriptive characterization of generics. Proponents of such accounts,
however, will typically view unboundedness as an e/ect of the underlying generic
operator, while they will not see unboundedness as a primitive factor playing a role in
the construction of generic interpretations. It is interesting, in this respect, to consider
the position of Carlson (), which gives us the occasion to bring imperfectivity
to the fore. Departing from the original proposal in his dissertation, Carlson ()
assumes a dyadic operator relating a restrictive part, which he calls related constituent,
and a matrix—exactly the same idea that would be systematized later in!e Generic
Book. However, he also entertains a notion of unboundedness in order to characterize
generics in opposition to universal statements that contingently hold of bounded
circumstances. He considers the contrast in acceptability between (a) and (b):
() a. A cat runs across my lawn every day.
b. ?A cat runs across my lawn every day this week and last.
What is at stake in (a) and (b) is the possibility of an unbounded reading
of the universally quanti-ed time adverbial. +is is only possible in (a), not in
(b), where the adverbial must express universal quanti-cation over a bounded
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domain of days, namely the days in this week and in last week. As a consequence of the
bounded interpretation of the time adverbial in (b), only an episodic reading of
the sentencewould be possible, if it weren’t the case that the English present tense does
not allow for episodic readings (i.e. event-in-progress readings) of eventive sentences.
As a consequence, (b) is not acceptable. Carlson’s point can perhaps be better
appreciated if we consider the past tense counterparts of (a) and (b), which
are both acceptable:
() a. A cat ran across my lawn every day.
b. A cat ran across my lawn every day this week and last.
Only (a) can be interpreted as a generic, stating that on every day within a past
situation lacking speci-ed bounds a cat ran across my lawn. +e sentence need not
be so interpreted, as it can also have an episodic reading in which it refers to a
past bounded situation and quanti-es over a -nite set of days within this situation.
Crucially, however, if it is interpreted generically, it makes a nomic statement which
is not bounded to a -nite set of actual days in the past. Sentence (b), on the other
hand, can only be accepted as a universal quanti-cation contingently holding of a
bounded situation: for every day within this week and last week, it turned out that
a cat ran across my lawn on that day ((b) only has the meaning of an accidental
generalization). Yet other examples discussed by Carlson, which nicely highlight the
relevance of unboundedness to the availability of generic meaning, are the following
sentences involving clausal adverbials instead of quanti-ed time adverbials in the role
of the related constituent:
() a. John jumped when the -re alarm went o/. [Bounded, Episodic]
b. John eats when he gets hungry. [Unbounded, Habitual]
Unfortunately, Carlson is not very explicit on the notion of unboundedness that he
makes use of. He suggests that in (a) this notion cannot be taken to be unbound-
edness of the domain of the universal quanti-er, i.e. quanti-cation over an unlimited
number of days, and that the notion in question is rather related to intensionality in
this context. His somewhat vague remark is that ‘(t)he beginnings of a satisfactory
analysis would treat the meaning of the phrase [every day] in (a) as a function
from contexts to all days in that context, and it is this meaning that is related in the
generic interpretation of (a)’ (Carlson ).
Before moving to the next section, we note that in languages with a perfec-
tive/imperfective distinction morphologically realized in their aspectual systems,
examples (a) and (b), on the one hand, and examples (b) and (a),
on the other hand, would be translated using di/erent aspectual forms, namely the
imperfective for (a) and (b) (past for the former, present for the latter), and
the perfective (past) for (b) and (a), as shown by the following sentences from
Italian:
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() a. Ogni giorno un gatto attraversava correndo il mio prato.
Every day a cat crossed(sg,past impf) running the my lawn
Every day a cat used to run across my lawn. [Habitual]
b. John mangia quando gli viene fame.
John eat(sg,pres impf) when to-him come(sg,pres impf) hunger
John eats when he gets hungry. [Habitual]
() a. Ogni giorno di questa settimana e di quella scorsa un gatto ha attraversato
correndo il mio prato.
Every day of this week and of that past a cat has crossed running the my
lawn
Every day of this week and of the last week a cat ran across my lawn. [non-
Habitual]
b. John ha saltato quando l’allarme anti-incendio ha smesso.
Johnhas jumped(past perf) when the alarmanti--re has stopped(past perf)
John jumped when the *re alarm went o+. [non-Habitual]
Imperfectively marked verb forms, as in (a) and (b) above, are the natural
option for expressing generic meaning in Italian. Only imperfective forms are com-
patible with an unbounded temporal interpretation in this language, while perfective
(past) forms locate an eventuality within the limits of a bounded situation, even in
sentences containing a universally quanti-ed time adverbial, e.g. (a) above.
Imperfective forms allow for both episodic (event-in-progress) and generic inter-
pretations, as shown by the ambiguity of () between the two readings given below:
() Gianni guidava un’auto sportiva.
Gianni drive(sg, past impf) a sports car
Reading . ‘Gianni was driving a sports car.’
Reading . ‘Gianni used to drive a sports car.’
+e di/erence between the two interpretations seems to reduce to the following fact:
in the episodic reading the sentence is interpreted relative to a small time interval (e.g.
yesterday at  pm), in the generic reading it is interpreted relative to an interval lacking
speci-ed temporal bounds (Gianni’s lifespan? Gianni’s youth?). It is thus tempting
to assume that the di/erence between the two readings of () is not a matter of
semantic ambiguity a/ecting some part of the sentence, or a matter of the presence
 As such, perfective forms in Italian are unable to express generic meaning. By this remark, we do not
intend to exclude the possibility of referring to a habit through a perfective form, as in Gianni ha fumato
la pipa per tutta la sua vita (‘Gianni smoked a pipe all his life’).+e natural reading of this sentence refers
to a habit of Gianni’s (in a perfective way). It should be mentioned, however, that it is one thing to achieve
reference to a habit, and quite another thing to express a habitual meaning: the former admittedly can
be done through a perfective sentence, but the latter can only be done by using an imperfective sentence.
For example, the perfective sentence given above, though referring to a habit, does not express generic or
habitual meaning - for one thing, it lacks the intensional character that true generics have.
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or absence of a generic operator, but that it is uniquely due to a di/erence in the size
of the interval relative to which the sentence is interpreted. +is observation points
to a view in which temporal unboundedness plays a primary role in determining the
emergence of generic meaning, as will be discussed in the following section.
.... Genericity and unboundedness: a pragmatic issue +e alternative view
that we consider in this section is that themain factor responsible for the emergence of
genericmeaning is a general property of unboundedness, not the presence of a generic
operator in the logical form of the sentence. Declerck () is a representative of
this view. +e starting point of Declerck’s analysis is signi-cantly di/erent from the
traditional one, which is mainly concerned with the generative issue of how generic
readings should be derived in compositional semantics, and is rather concerned with
the processing issue of how speakers interpret certain sentences as episodic and others
(even though they may be structurally similar to the former) as generic, as illustrated
by the interpretive contrast between () and ():
() +e boy is cunning.
() +e fox is cunning.
Declerck’s idea is that there is no deep di/erence in logical formbetween non-generics
and generics. In particular, the latter do not di/er from the former in having a hidden
generic operator which should be made explicit at logical form, but the di/erence
between them has to do with whether the sentence interpretation is pragmatically
restricted to a bounded domain or not.+e interpretive rules that are relevant for the
contrast at hand are claimed to be derivable from the Gricean maxims, speci-cally
the maxim of Quantity. On this approach, the unbounded character of generics ulti-
mately depends on interpretive rules requiring that the information conveyed by an
utterance be maximized (the maximal-set principle, requiring that the maximal set
of entities allowed by the contextual restrictions be referred to, and the inclusiveness
principle, requiring application of predication on a set X to all members of X; see
Declerck : –).+ese rules interact with other rules prescribing relevance and
truthfulness, whereby the ‘unbounding’ e/ects of the former are constrained in the
appropriate contexts.+e maximizing rules account for the emergence of the generic
interpretation of () (provided that in the utterance context there is no relevant
individual fox immediately accessible to the hearer as the referent of the de-nite
DP): by the maximal-set principle, reference is achieved to what is called the generic
set of foxes, i.e. the set of all actual and possible (past and future) foxes, and by
the inclusiveness principle the property of being cunning is then predicated of each
individual in this unbounded set, conveying the information that being cunning is an
essential property of foxes, as opposed to one that is contingently predicated of some
foxes only. What prevents a similar generic interpretation of () is the interaction
between themaximizing rules and other rules prescribing truthfulness and relevance:
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an unbounded interpretation of the subject DP the boy as referring to the generic set
of boys would in principle be possible, but ascribing the property of being cunning to
all possible boys would result in a false statement, hence the hearer goes for a weaker
interpretation here, one in which reference is made to a contextually relevant boy
(provided that there is one in the immediate context), of which the property of being
cunning is predicated. Declerck’s analysis relating genericity to unboundedness can
explain why sentences like (a) and (b) are not acceptable as generics:
() a. ?Twelve cats are intelligent when they have blue eyes.
b. ?A cat has a tail these days.
Sentence (a) is claimed to be odd because it is numerically bounded by the indef-
inite ‘twelve cats’, while if we remove the numerical determiner ‘twelve’ and leave the
bare plural ‘cats’ in place, we obtain an acceptable generic sentence:
() Cats are intelligent when they have blue eyes.
+e kind of oddness observed in (b) above, on the other hand, is explained as fol-
lows: by the pragmatic rules of interpretation, the clause a cat has a tail is interpreted
as implying that any arbitrary cat has a tail, i.e. having a tail is a property which is
essential to cats; this character, however, is incompatible with the temporal restriction
introduced by the time adverbial these days.
.... Problems and perspectives Unboundedness of generics with respect to
time has been questioned (e.g. Krifka et al. : ) on account of the observation
that at least generics from the variety of habituals are felicitously localizable to past
time and present time periods, as shown in (a) and (b):
() a. +ese days Mary smokes Marlboros.
b. In those days / In the nineties Mary used to smoke Marlboros.
If we are willing to pursue a characterization of generic sentences in terms of temporal
unboundedness, we then face an empirical challenge posed by such examples.+e use
 Note that a simple restriction requiring the use of BPs or singular inde-nites, however, would not work
(as already noted by Krifka et al. ()).+is is shown by the acceptability of ():
() Two friends help each other.
Notice that the numeral two in () is acceptable because it does not introduce an arbitrary numerical
restriction, but serves to specify that the sentence is about groups of friends containing two individuals
each. Accordingly, the sentence gets the generic interpretation that any group of two friends x and y is such
that x helps y. +e conclusion is that () does not pose a real problem to the unboundedness analysis.
Compare the acceptability of () with the non-acceptability of (), in which the numerical restriction
introduced by four is not as easily motivated as the one in ():
() ? Four friends help each other.
We will not consider numerical unboundedness any further.
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of the time adverbials these days and in the nineties to locate Mary’s habit of smoking
Marlboros in (a) and (b) does not seem to give rise to oddness in the same
way that the use of temporal modi-ers does in examples () and (b). However,
we believe that the intuition behind the idea of temporal unboundedness is valid,
and examples like (a) and (b) simply demonstrate the necessity of suitably
restricting the unboundedness requirement. Although (b) shows that generics (in
their subvariety of habituals) do admit temporal restrictions, we observe that not just
any temporal restriction would work. For example, restriction to a particular point in
time as in () would not do:
() ? On that day at  pmMary used to smoke Marlboros.
It seems that a more appropriate way to characterize generic meaning would be to say
that it is triggered whenever the reference situationwhich underlies the interpretation
of the sentence has either unspeci-ed temporal bounds, or a suitably large temporal
size. By further pursuing this line of thought, we could end up with a scale of generic
sentences, with sentences like Dogs bark at the top of the scale (the underlying ref-
erence situation has unspeci-ed temporal bounds in these cases), and sentences like
!ese days Mary smokes Marlboros somewhere lower on the same scale (the underly-
ing reference situation has a large temporal size in these cases). To illustrate this idea,
we consider some more examples from Italian. In this language, where genericity is
expressed by imperfective sentences, which also allow for episodic, event-in-progress
readings when the reference situation is small. Compare (a)–(c), which are
anchored either to unbounded or to large situations and have generic meaning, with
(a) and (b), which are anchored to small situations and have episodicmeaning:
() a. Gianni è intelligente.
Gianni is intelligent.
b. Gianni suona la chitarra.
Gianni plays guitar.
c. In questi anni, Gianni gioca a calcio in una squadra locale.
Nowadays, Gianni plays football in a local team.
() a. Gianni è o/eso.
Gianni is o+ended.
b. Gianni legge un articolo in cucina.Gianni is reading an article in the kitchen.
c. ?In questi anni, Gianni è contento. ?Nowadays, Gianni is glad.
Sentences (a), (b), unlike (a), (b), have reference situations which lack
speci-ed temporal bounds, in the sense that a time adverbial could not be used in
either (a) or (b) to constrain the size of the reference situation. For example,
it would be odd to say Questa mattina Gianni è intelligente ‘+is morning Gianni is
intelligent’ orQuesta mattina Gianni suona la chitarra ‘+is morning Gianni plays the
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guitar’ (with the generic interpretation of the VP suona la chitarra, which is similar
to the interpretation of the ILP is a guitar player); however, such constraint of the
reference situation through a time adverbial is possible in (a), (b), as we could
felicitously say In questo momento Gianni è o+eso ‘At this moment Gianni is o/ended’
or In questo momento Gianni legge un articolo in cucina ‘At this moment Gianni is
reading an article in the kitchen’. On the other hand, (c) has a ‘large size’ reference
situation which is constrained by the time adverbial in questi anni ‘in these years’,
while the same adverbial gives rise to anomaly in (c), given that the predicate essere
contento ‘to be glad’ denotes a set of transitory states which do not hold of year-sized
intervals.+is proposal will make sense of a theory which allows for di/erent degrees
of genericity. Basically, a distinction will be drawn between ‘strong’ generics which do
not have any speci-ed temporal bounds, and ‘weaker’ generics which do have more
constrained reference situations, although characterized by a large size. +is paves
the way for empirical studies aimed at assessing the extent to which such theory is
supported by real data.
In conclusion, all parties recognize that some not well-de-ned property of
unboundedness is central to generics. We saw above that Carlson (), though
proposing a dyadic operator analysis which anticipates that of Krifka et al. (),
devotes much attention to a notion of unboundedness which he proposes as a fea-
ture discriminating between truly generic sentences and those which only express
accidental generalizations. In this respect, it is particularly interesting to consider
Krifka et al.’s perspective on Declerck’s proposal to have a property of unboundedness
explain the interpretation of restrictive when-clauses in generics: ‘[Declerck] argued
that [unboundedness], rather than the presence of a generic operator, is the essence of
restrictive when-clauses. We agree with his observation concerning the “unspeci-ed”
nature of when-clauses, but we claim that it is the presence of a generic operator (or
of explicit quanti-cational adverbs) which causes the when-clause to be “unspeci-c.” ’
(Krifka et al., : ). +us, the general point is that it is clear that unbound-
edness truly is a property characterizing generics; what is in question is whether
unboundedness should be viewed as the primary notion in the semantic theory of
generics or whether it is an e/ect dependent on an underlying generic operator.
According to this perspective, the real alternative to the prevailing analysis based
on some sort of covert generic operator is not simply to emphasize the presence of
an unbounded interpretation, but rather to claim that the unbounded interpretation
is not the e/ect of the semantic functioning of an ad hoc generic operator, but an
independent ingredient of the semantics of generics which, by itself or in interaction
with some other ingredient, produces generic meaning. An alternative of this kind,
even though restricted exclusively to habitual generics, is proposed inDel Prete’s paper
in this volume. Del Prete considers habitual generics in Italian, typically consisting of
imperfectively marked sentences. His proposal is based on amodal-temporal analysis
of the morphologically overt imperfective aspect in a branching-time model, where
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the semantic contribution of imperfective is a forward expansion of an input reference
situation in the model of the branching futures.+is contribution of the imperfective
is constant across the progressive and the generic readings of imperfective sentences,
and is not speci-cally invoked to account for the intensional character of generics in
particular.+e di/erence between progressive and generic readings is thus explained
in terms of a di/erence in the temporal size of the input reference situation: small
reference situations give rise to event-in-progress readings, where typically a singular
event of the type described by the VP is considered as covering the forward extended
situation, whereas large reference situations set the ground for the emergence of
generic readings, where typically plural events of that type are needed to cover the
forward extended situation.
... Plurality
.... State of the question in!e Generic Book and problems On the analysis of
habituals in terms of the covert operator GEN proposed by Krifka et al. , it is not
trivial to explain the contrast between () and () below. In particular, given that
the logical form of () could be either the formula () or the formula (), this
analysismisses an explanation of the ‘same object’ implication of () thatmakes this
sentence odd—indeed this sentence, to the extent that it is acceptable, is understood
as implying that John writes the same song over and over, but neither () nor ()
predicts this implication.
() When John writes a song, he goes to the Irish pub.
() ? John writes a song at the Irish pub.
() GENs[John is at the Irish pub in s] [∃x [John writes x in s & x is a song in s]]
‘Generally, when John is at the Irish pub, he writes a song there.’
() GENs,x[John writes x in s & x is a song in s] [ John is at the Irish pub in s]
‘Generally, when John writes a song, he is at the Irish pub.’
A less recognized point is that Carlson’s analysis in terms of the monadic operator
Gnwould also have di3culties in accounting for the oddness of (). Carlson ()
shows that the Gn analysis predicts that () does not imply that there is a particular
knife used by John on every occasion. +e way this prediction is borne out is by the
occurrence of the existential quanti-er corresponding to a knife in the intensional
context set up by Gn, as shown in the formal analysis ():
() John eats his dinner with a knife.
 +is type of analysis is something that, as far as we can tell, was brie,y touched on by Ferreira in his
PhD dissertation (Ferreira ), although he is not explicit about the role of the temporal size of the input
situation in the emergence of generic readings, and mainly focuses on the role of event plurality.
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() [Gn (∧λxs.∃y[knife(y) ∧ eat-dinner-with′(xs, y)])](John)
‘+e individual John has the property of habitually eating his dinner with a
knife.’
While this prediction is correct for (), Carlson’s theory is bound to make a similar
but wrong prediction for (), according to the formal analysis ():
() [Gn (∧λxs.∃y[song(y) ∧ write-at-the-Irish-pub′(xs, y)])](John)
‘+e individual John has the property of habitually writing a song at the Irish
pub.’
+e latter prediction is wrong, since sentence () does imply that there is a particu-
lar song written by John on every occasion. On a covert operator analysis, to account
for the oddness of examples like () one would need to assume that the singular
inde-nite obligatorily takes scope over the generic operator in such cases, while it can
scope below the generic operator in sentences like (). In the absence of a principled
explanation of the contrast between () and (), however, such an account could
be criticized as stipulative. It is worth noting that (), if embedded in a suitable
discourse context, no longer implies that John writes the same song over and over.
One such context is provided below (Sandro Zucchi, p.c.):
() Here’s what John does during the day. He drinks a glass of wine at the restau-
rant and writes a song at the Irish pub.
Our intuition is that the -rst sentence of (), through the generic interpretation
of the free relative what John does during the day, sets up a restriction for the inter-
pretation of the following sentence. +e latter is thus interpreted along the lines of
the paraphrase (), whose logical form may plausibly involve a dyadic operator
corresponding to the adverb generally, similar to Krifka’s GEN, as in ():
() Generally, during the day, John drinks a glass of wine at the restaurant and
writes a song at the Irish pub.
() GENs [s is during the day] [ ∃x∃y [x is a glass of wine in s & y is a song in s &
John drinks x in s & John writes y in s]]
Our proposal concerning () is thus that this example bears a relation to the odd
sentence () which is the same relation as () bears to the odd sentence ():
() Mary smokes a cigarette a0er dinner.
() ?Mary smokes a cigarette.
In both () and (), a generically interpreted time adverbial (during the day in the
former, a,er dinner in the latter) sets up a restriction for a tripartite quanti-cational
structure. Crucially, our claim is that such a tripartite structure is not available for
simple sentences like () and (), which we believe, following Ferreira (),
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express genericity that does not depend on an underlying quanti-er. In the next
section we sketch some ways to address the problem raised by (). +e central
concept that we introduce is that of verbal plurality.
.... New proposals +e issue of the temporal size of the situation to which
generics are anchored interacts with the orthogonal issue of verbal plurality, which we
mean to refer to plurality as it manifests itself in the domain of verb predicates (Cusic
; Landman ; Van Geenhoven ; Kratzer ).+e interaction between
large-size temporal anchors and verbal plurality in habituals is explored in Del Prete’s
paper in this volume.+e crucial point here is that not only are habituals observed to
be predicated of large situations, but also that ‘macro-events’ are intuitively involved in
such predications. In the formal semantics literature, verbal plurality has been mod-
eled by extending Link’s (a) algebraic treatment of plural and mass nouns to the
event domain. Here, we consider Landman’s () technical implementation, which
is closely related to Krifka (Gerstner-Link and Krifka ; Krifka ).+roughout
this section, when we talk of sums of events/individuals (also occasionally referred to
as plural events/individuals), we will thus be assuming an algebraic approach such as
has been familiar since Link’s work.
Landman () proposes dealing with a number of phenomena, in particular
cumulative and distributive readings of sentences with plural subjects and/or plural
objects, on the basis of the assumption that verbs can refer to plural events.+e basic
idea that he pursues is to allow for an ontology with a domain of events including
sums of atomic events alongside atomic events themselves, and to have verb predicates
denote event sums as well as atomic events.+ematic rolesmap events, either singular
or plural, onto their participants. Participants of an event sum or plural event e are
individual sums or plural individuals made up by the atomic individuals which are
the participants of the atomic parts of e.
In other work, Van Geenhoven () mainly focuses on frequentative readings of
achievement and accomplishment sentences with bare plural and singular inde-nite
complements. Her paper brings into focus the problem of the di/erent ways in which
verb plurality and plural vs singular complements scopally interact with each other.
A problem she considers that is relevant here is the wide scope of singular inde-nites
with respect to for-adverbials in sentences like (), as opposed to the narrow-scope
reading of bare plurals in the same position—as in () (such examples had already
been discussed by Verkuyl  and Dowty ):
() Bill dialed a phone number for an hour. ‘Bill dialed the same phone number
over and over for an hour.’
() Bill dialed phone numbers for an hour. ‘Bill dialed di/erent phone numbers
for an hour.’
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She explains the contrast between () and () by assuming a silent V-level plu-
ralization operator which in these examples returns a plurality of dialing events,
and by further assuming that singular inde-nites cannot be distributed over the
atomic parts of a plural event, unlike bare plurals. +is issue is closely related to
the contrast between Mary smokes a cigarette and Mary smokes cigarettes, which
has been discussed in the literature on generics (this problem is considered in the
papers by Cabredo Hofherr and Del Prete in this volume).+e relation between van
Geenhoven’s plurality-based account and habituality, however, is not developed in her
paper.
Kratzer’s () core contribution is the Lexical Cumulativity Hypothesis (LCH),
according to which verbs (as well as nouns) are born as plurals, whichmeans that they
have cumulative reference in Krifka’s () sense: P has cumulative reference i/ if
x is P and y is P then the sum of x and y is also P. +is is proposed as a language-
universal property. Regarding verb predicates, Kratzer construes LCH in an event-
based framework à la Krifka–Landman.+us, lexically, verb predicates denote sums
of events (with singular events as the limiting case). Note that the adoption of LCH
allows prediction of the availability of plural (i.e. iterative and possibly habitual) inter-
pretations of sentences like John jumped, notwithstanding the fact that such sentences
lack overt marking of plurality on the verb. Amongst the data that Kratzer deals
with, sentences with wide-scope singular inde-nites are once again crucial. Like van
Geenhoven, she also focuses on the property of singular inde-nites by which they do
not distribute over the atomic parts of plural events in the denotation of the verb.
Generics—at least in their habitual subvariety, which is the primary focus of this
section—seem to involve reference to plural events, for example the truth of ()
seems to require a plurality of events of Mary’s smoking a cigarette a0er dinner to
have already occurred and another plurality of such events to be expected to occur in
the future.
() Mary smokes a cigarette a0er dinner.
+is plural feature of () is in clear contrast with the singular character of the
episodic sentence (), which intuitively refers to a single event of Mary’s smoking a
cigarette a0er dinner:
() At this a0er-dinner moment, Mary is smoking a cigarette.
+e relation between habituality and verbal plurality has been emphasized by Ferreira
(), and is elaborated upon in the papers by Cabredo Hofherr, Del Prete, and
Boneh and Doron in this volume. According to Ferreira, bare habituals like ()
above (repeated below as ()), i.e. habituals with no adverbs of quanti-cation,
should not be analyzed as quanti-cational tripartite structures as in the classical GEN-
analysis, but rather should be analyzed as involving reference to plural events, along
the lines of the semi-formal paraphrase in ().
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() When John writes a song, he goes to the Irish pub.
() +e events e such that John writes a song in e are such that John goes to the
Irish pub in e.
Ferreira’s claim is that bare habituals involve a covert plural de-nite determiner over
events, rather than the covert generic operator GEN. According to Ferreira, there is a
parallel between () and (), which contains an overt plural de-nite description
restricted by a relative clause.
() In my family, the women who married a professor are happy.
+e when-clause in () is claimed to be parallel to the relative clause in (), in
the following sense: both the when-clause and the relative clause introduce a dis-
tributive operator in the sentence, with the e/ect of ascribing the relevant property
(i.e. the property of being an event in which John writes a song in (), and the
property of being married to a professor in ()) to every atomic part of the plural
event/individual referred to by the de-nite description.+is distribution to the atomic
parts of the pluralities involved is shown in the formal analyses () and () (ι
is a plural de-nite determiner, ‘E’ and ‘X’ range over plural events and individuals
respectively, ‘e’ and ‘x’ over atomic events and individuals respectively, ‘<AT ’ is the
atomic part-of relation between events or individuals):
() ιE[∀e(e <AT E)(∃ysong(y) ∧ writes(John, y, e))][goes-to(Irish-pub, John,E)]
(+e plural event E such that for every atomic part e of E there is a song that
John writes in e is such that John goes to the Irish pub in E.)
() ιX[∀x(x <AT X)(woman(x) ∧ ∃yprofessor(y) ∧married(y, x))][happy(X)]
(+e plural individual X such that for every atomic part x of X, x is a woman
and there is a professor that xmarried, is such that X is happy.)
An important piece of evidence in favor of Ferreira’s analysis comes from bare habitu-
als embedding singular inde-nite DPs, which imply that the referent of the inde-nite
is the same across the di/erent atomic parts of the plural event referred to.+e relevant
contrast is between the good sentence () above and the bad sentence () (the
same as () above), whose analysis is given in () (capital letters signal prosodic
stress; stressed material goes into the matrix at logical form):
() ? John writes a song at THE IRISH PUB.
() ιE[∃ysong(y)∧writes (John, y,E)][at-the-Irish-pub(John,E)] (+e plural
event E such that there is a song that John writes in E is such that John is at
the Irish pub in E.)
Sentence () is odd because it implies that John writes the same song over and over.
+is is correctly predicted by the analysis (), as the existential quanti-er ∃y in this
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formula directly operates at the level of the plural event E, and not at the level of the
atomic parts of E, unlike what happens in the analysis of () which we just saw in
(). Note that there is a parallel contrast between () and the odd sentence (),
whose analysis is given in ():
() ?In my family, the wives of a professor are happy.
() ιX[∃yprofessor(y) ∧ wives(X, y)][happy(X)] (+e plural individual X such
that there is a professor of which the atomic individuals in X are wives is such
that X is happy.)
Sentence () is also odd because it implies that in my family there are many women
married to the same professor.+is is also correctly predicted by the analysis (), in
a structurally similarway: the existential quanti-er ∃y in this formula directly operates
at the level of the plural individual X, and not at the level of the atomic parts of X,
unlikewhat happens in ().+us, according to Ferreira, only in () is the property
of being an event in which John writes a song distributed over the atomic subevents
of the plural event referred to, and this is achieved through the distributive operator
introduced by the when-clause. On the other hand, no such distribution is possible
in (), hence in the latter case it is not possible to have di/erent songs for di/erent
writing episodes. Analogously, only in () is there distribution of the property of
being married to a professor over the atomic parts of the plural individual referred
to, and this is achieved through the distributive operator introduced by the relative
clause. On the other hand, there is no such distribution in (), hence in the latter
case it is not possible to have di/erent professors for di/erent women.
Ferreira also proposes an analysis of habituals with an even simpler structure
than ()’s, namely habituals such as (), which he calls simple habituals (Ferreira
: ).
() Mary smokes.
Not only do such habituals lack an overt Q-adverb, but they also lack a restrictive
clause or any other material that could provide a restriction for a covert operator at
logical form. Ferreira’s claim is that simple habituals can be uttered out of the bluewith
no need of an implicit restrictor for a covert operator, since they do not actually have
a covert operator in the -rst place. As soon as some linguistic/non-linguistic material
is supplied, however, sentences become potentially ambiguous in being interpreted
both as simple habituals or as bare habituals with a covert de-nite event determiner.
For example, regarding (), two options seem to be possible: either the clauseMary
smokes is used as a stand-alone sentence to express a self-standing habitual propo-
sition, or it provides the material to be predicated of an underlying plural de-nite
description of events, as in the context set up by the question (). In the former
case the logical form would be as in (), in the latter as in ():
() What do your friends do a0er dinner?
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() ∃E[smokes(Mary,E) ∧ now ≤ τ (E)]
‘+ere is a plural event E such that Mary smokes in E and the running time of
E includes the present time.’
() ιE[∀e(e <AT E)(a0er-dinner(e) ∧ ∃x do(my-friends, x, e))][∀e(e <AT
E)(smokes(Mary, e))]
‘+e events e which are a0er-dinner events in whichmy friends do something
are such that Mary smokes in e.’
Boneh andDoron (b, b) develop a view of habituality that takes into account
event plurality, but casts it within a theory that relies on hidden HAB operators.





















Yael used to go to work by bus.
+e -rst one expresses habituality as amodal notion, that is to say as a disposition.+e
periphrastic form expresses habituality as an extensional notion: repeated events are
interpreted as a habit.+ey thus distinguish two operators HABmod andHABasp.+e
authors de-neHABmod as an operator that depends on the summation of events in all
the accessible worlds of the modal base MBi,w which is a set of gnomic alternatives
to world w at time i, ordered with respect to an ideal world where dispositions hold
inde-nitely once initiated. +ey thus claim that HABmod is dispositional. Crucial to
their analysis is that HABmod requires the existence of an iteration of events which
‘continues’ an actual event, for each and every world of the appropriate sort.
Boneh and Doron (present volume) explore the issue further, considering a variety
of habitual constructions in English. Analyses that consider generic sentences as
purely dispositional (i.e. not even requiring the existence of a sole instantiation) have
also been developed. We turn to this issue in the next section.
.. Genericity and the semantics of abilities and dispositions
Generic statements have been argued to express dispositions and abilities since Dahl
() and later Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (). A sentence like (a) has
been paraphrased as (b).
() a. A Ferrari goes at km/ph.
b. A Ferrari can go at km/ph.
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More fundamentally, abilitative and dispositional statements have been seen as intrin-
sically generic (Kenny ; Fara ), since they persist beyond actions and are
independent of particular circumstances.
We -rst consider in subsection ... sentences like (a), for which it can be
argued that there is a covert can. We then turn to overt can in subsection ... and
raise the question of its interpretation in relation to tense and aspect.+ere we discuss
two notions of abilities: generic and speci-c abilities.
... Covert can If generic statements are associated with a covert modal opera-
tor, then the question arises as to how this operator should be interpreted, and more
speci-cally, how does it di/er from the overt one.
It has been repeatedly noted that ‘one of the main functions of generic sentences
appears to be that of expressing capability or possibility’ (Chierchia and McConnell-
Ginet ).
() a. John runs miles without ever stopping.
b. John can run miles per hour without ever stopping.
() a. +is program parses complicated sentences.
b. +is program can parse complicated sentences.
It has also been noted that generic sentences with covert modality cannot be inter-
preted as those with overt ones, as the oddness of (b) reveals.
() a. A boat ,oats.
b. ??A boat can ,oat. (Krifka et al. : )
+e question of the interpretation of covert modality is addressed in Menéndez-
Benito’s paper in the present volume.
.... Menéndez-Benito’s account and one amendment Menéndez-Benito ()
proposes that covert can is used uniquely for ‘inner dispositions’. One of the major
advances of this view is that it does not require the property to be actually instantiated.
Stating that a boat ,oats means that a boat has the ability to ,oat in virtue of some
inner property, not that a boat has necessarily ,oated.
However, as noted byMenéndez-Benito (), not all generic sentences work this
way. For example, the immediate reading of () is that John has already played the
trombone.
() John plays the trombone.
 It has not been previously noted that ‘A boat can ,oat thanks to its concave shape’ is in fact acceptable.
However further discussion of this example would lead us astray from our discussion on genericity and
abilities. See Mari (c).
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Menéndez-Benito explains that in order to acquire the ability, humans must have
exercised it.
+is explanation nevertheless fails to predict some contrasts. Only (b) means
that John has already read  signs, whereas (a) only means that a Chinese
-ve-year-old boy is able to read  characters. In (b) read has an ‘agentive’
interpretation.
() a. A Chinese -ve-year-old boy can read  characters.
b. John can read  characters.
+e problem here for Menéndez-Benito account is that, although ‘a Chinese -ve-
year-old boy’ introduces an animate entity it is not required that the property be
instantiated, as predicted by the account.
To solve this issue, one can appeal to the question of degrees of speci-city. In the
generic sentence (a) the inde-nite DP introduces a non-speci-c entity.
Another potential shortcoming for the account pertains to human behavior.
Humans have, like robots, inner dispositions. For instance, unless a newborn has a
particular abnormality, he is predisposed to smile at about fourweeks of age.When the
newborn is threeweeks old, amother can utter ().+e only possible interpretation,
though, is that the child has already smiled and not that he will eventually smile as
predicted by Menéndez-Benito’s account.
() My child smiles.
A potential solution to these problems involves the following principle of agency
maximization.
() Maximize agency. If the subject entity is speci-c and is human, then it is
inferred that s/he is an agent that has exercised his/her capacity and that action
has taken place.
Since the entity in (a) is not speci-c, the property need not be instantiated (see
Krifka et al.  for the foundational idea that inde-nite generic sentences do not
require actual individuals. See discussion in section ..).
.... Intensional AB without initiating events +ere is a variety of generic sen-
tences that the ‘inner disposition’ view cannot cover. For instance there is no ‘inner
disposition’ that explains that a refrigerator costs a lot of money:
() A refrigerator costs .
In a di/erent account appealing to a cover abilitative operator,Mari (a), following
Eckardt (), argues that characterizing sentences are about ideal worlds, i.e. the
modal basis is restricted to worlds without accidents and proposes the analysis in
(). It must be emphasized here that this analysis applies only to inde-nite generic
sentences.
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() ∀w′ ∈ MB(w), x[w′is sucht that there are no impediments][P(x,w′) →
Q(x,w′)]
Paraphrase: in all worlds w′ in the modal basis of w such that there are no
impediments, if x is a P entity in w′, it is also a Q entity in w′.
+e conditional analysis of generic sentences is not new (see Part  of the intro-
duction). What matters here is that the modal basis is restricted to worlds in which
there are no impediments.+is restriction is is derived in a principled way from the
semantics of abilities and dispositions.+e argument goes as follows:
. +e inde-nite provides a free variable (Heim ), which is existentially
bounded if there is a spatio-temporal location speci-ed (see for discussion,
Chierchia ; McNally ).
() a. A bird ,ies over the roof. (∃)
b. A bird ,ies. (∀)
. In the latter case (b), following Kenny (), one can assume that the
sentence has an ‘abilitative’ interpretation, i.e. the predicate in the present tense
denotes an ‘ability’. An ability is a state of the agent that has an explanatory value
w.r.t. action. In (b), ‘,ies’ denotes an ability of a bird.
. Generic inde-nites, which denote unspeci-c entities can be attributed abilities
(they cannot be attributed habits, however, since habits can only be attributed
on the basis of observation of repeated action, for a speci-c entity).Mari (a)
proposes that a silent AB operator be reconstructed. Distinct from Boneh and
Doron’s HABmod operator, AB does not require even the existence of events,
and does not imply summation. It is a mere intensional operator that describes
un-actualized abilities.
. Abilities lead to success when there are no opposing conditions (see Fara ).
. Hence, worlds with no accidents are triggered by the type of modal that is
reconstructed to get the generic interpretation of the inde-nite with the present
tense.
+e notion of world without impediments elaborated in Mari’s account is con-
trasted with two other conceptions. Firstly, it is contrasted with Cohen’s () view
according towhich a normalworld is one inwhich regularities observed in the past are
considered to hold in the future. According to this view of normality () is predicted
to be false since most turtles are caught by predators and die young.
() A turtle has a long lifespan.
Secondly, it is contrasted with Nickel’s () view according to which things are
normal in di/erent ‘ways’, but the notion of normality is not further spelled out. On
Nickel’s view it is unclear what it might mean for a refrigerator to be normal (to cost
?, see ()).
–––– -Mari-et-al-c-drv Mari-et-al (Typeset by SPi)  of  August ,  :
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF–REVISES, //, SPi
Introduction 
... Tensed abilitative can and two types of abilities: generic and speci*c abilities
Much of the recent and ongoing debate on the semantics of abilities and dispositions
has focused on tensed abilitative can in Romance languages (see e.g. Hacquard ;
Mari andMartin , b; Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria ; Homer ;
Mari c; Mari and Schweitzer ). It has been in fact noted that abilitative
can in the perfective and imperfective aspect is (prima facie) associated with two
di/erent types of entailments (see Bhatt ). Here we focus on French. In particular,
while pouvoir in the imperfective does not entail the truth of the event denoted by
the embedded predicate, this entailment is derived when pouvoir is in the perfective
aspect. Both the following sentences have an epistemic and an abilitative interpreta-














































John could move the table, but he did not do it.
On the initial explanation of Bhatt (), who -rst noted this contrast in Hindi, two
lexical entries for can were distinguished: an abilitative can and an action can. +is
contrast is studied in Hacquard (), who aims to keep only one lexical entry for
can. In comparing the abilitative reading of (b) with the epistemic reading which
is also available for this sentence, Hacquard explains that the abilitative reading is
obtained when the modality is interpreted below aspect and scopes over a prop-
erty of events (on the epistemic reading the modality is considered to scope over
tense). While capturing the distinction between abilitative and epistemic modality
(see counter-proposals in Homer  and Mari ), this view does not tell us
much about abilitativemodality itself which is treated as circumstantial modality.+e
contrast in () has been revised in subsequent literature. In particular Mari and
Martin () point to the fact that the actuality entailment is not derived when an
overt temporal adverb is speci-ed as in ().
() Le robot a pupresent.perfect repasser les chemises à un stade bien précis de son
développement, mais il ne l’a pas fait
!e robot could iron shirts at a precise stage of its development but it did not
do it.
Here a so-called ‘quasi-counterfactual’ meaning is obtained (see Mari c). +e
intendedmeaning is that the robotwould have been able to iron shirts during a certain
period of time during its development, but that functionality was then suppressed
 For additional data see Homer ().
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and thus the robot never ultimately ironed shirts. +e conditional is more likely
to be used in this context but the present perfect is also acceptable. In explaining
these data, Mari and Martin (b) propose an ontological view, and build on the
Aristotelian distinction between two types of abilities.+is distinction is formulated
in the following terms by Aristotle (de Interpretatione, ,):
. . . ‘Possible’ itself is ambiguous. It is used, on the one hand of facts and of things that are
actualized; it is ‘possible’ for someone to walk, inasmuch as he actually walks, and in generally
we call a thing ‘possible’ since it is now realized. On the other hand, ‘possible’ is used of a thing
thatmight be realized; it is possible for someone to walk since in certain conditions he would . . .
+is distinction has been adopted or proposed in similar terms by a number of
authors (although not all recognize that the distinction was initiated by Aristotle),
most notably by Austin (a), Von Wright () and +alberg (). +ere are
various ways to understand the notion of capacity in acto (i.e. the actualized capac-
ity). +e most radical view consists in denying of this type of capacity the status of
‘ability’ (+alberg ; in the linguistic literature, Bhatt ). In this case ‘ability’
means ‘action’. According to the pragmatic view, a capacity in acto is a capacity that
is ‘attributed’ on the basis of the fact that an action has been observed (Austin a
and recently, in the linguistic literature, Piñón ). Across these understandings of
the Aristotelian distinction, all authors agree on the fact that the capacity in acto is
considered to be speci*c, that is to say, relative to an occasion for acting. A general
ability is instead a state of the agent that holds across situations (for the -rst use of
speci-c vs generic ability, see Honoré ()). Mari and Martin () spell out an
ontological distinction for this view.+ey relabel the Aristotelian distinction between
two types of abilities as generic and action-dependent abilities (respectively GA and
ADA). +ey propose the following de-nitions, which consist of three ontological
constraints, plus a fourth epistemological one, which guides the criterion for ability
attribution.
() Generic abilities
• GAs do not require verifying instances (one does not have to kill a rabbit to
have the GA to kill a rabbit)
• GAs are ascribed to an agent i only if i could perform repeatedly the action
if desired
• GAs are conceived by default as unbounded (temporally persistent): if a GA
is ascribed to i in t, it is typically assumed that i has the same GA in some
t’⊃ t
• GAs are a positive explanatory factor in accounting for the agent’s perfor-
mance of an action (attributing to the agent i the GA to perform the action
a can explain the fact that he performs a; ‘he was able to do it, so he did it’)
Generic abilities are abilities à la Kenny ().
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() Action-dependent abilities
• ADAs require an action to exist—actually, an ADA ontologically depends
on the corresponding action
• ADAs are weaker abilities than GAs because a unique and non-repeatable
performance su3ces to imply the corresponding ADA
• ADAs have the same temporal boundaries as the action on which they
depend and are thus bounded (Paul was able to hit three bull’s eyes in a
row exactly at the interval the hit three bull’s eyes in a row)
• +e attribution to the agent i of the ADAs to do the action a is not typically
used as an explanation of the fact that i did a. It is rather because a performs
an action a that we attribute him the ADAs to perform a (‘he did it, so he
was able to do it’).
+is distinction between two types of abilities is revealed in the distinction between
the perfective and imperfective aspect. As was discussed in section ..., the imper-
fective denotes an unbounded period of time in Romance languages and thus is likely
to be used to express a generic meaning.+e perfective denotes a bounded period of
time and is more likely to be used to express punctual or accidental occurrences of
events or states.
As for pouvoir (‘can’), Mari andMartin explain that when this verb is in the perfect
aspect it can either denote a bounded generic ability (as in ()) or an action-
dependent ability (as in (b)). +ey explain that the actuality entailment arises in
the latter case, since this entailment is characteristic of the action-dependent ability,
which, in and of itself, requires an action to exist. +ey explain that the actuality
entailment does not arise when pouvoir is in the imperfective aspect as it then denotes
a generic ability, which is not associated with an actuality entailment.
Without stating this overtly, the authors assume an optimality theory frame-
work. Generic abilities are states and are thus unbounded. Action-dependent abilities
depend on action and are thus bounded. Since the imperfective and the perfective
aspect denote respectively an unbounded and a bounded period of time, they are
chosen to express, respectively, generic (unbounded) abilities and action-dependent
(bounded abilities).
+e robot example in () illustrates the case inwhich the perfective is also used to
express a generic ability (i.e. an ability which is not instantiated by an actual action), as
a bounded period of time at which the ability holds is targeted (that bounded period
of time is provided by the temporal adverb).
 +is view has been criticized by Piñón () who claims that there are only abilities as explanatory
factors for action and proposes treating the distinction on a pragmatic level elaborating on the fourth
epistemological condition and overtly using abductive reasoning. For a discussion of ability attribution
and abductive reasoning, see Mari (c).
 For a formal analysis that uses the bounded-unbounded distinction without resorting to an optimality
framework, see Mari (c).
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+ework ofGiannakidou and Staraki (present volume) builds onMari andMartin’s
distinction, but shows that the distinction between generic and speci-c abilities is not
determined by aspect. +ey examine data from Greek and show that both types of
abilities can be associated with both perfective and imperfective aspect.
. Genericity and the sentence
+e discussion in the last part of this introduction begins by acknowledging that there
is a variety of generic sentences and addresses the question of whether this variety
correlates with particular linguistic forms. Generic sentences with singular inde-nites
on the one hand and bare plural generics (in English) and de-nite plural generics
(in Romance languages) on the other are considered. Section .. discusses the
contribution of di/erent determiners to the interpretation of the sentences. Section
.. addresses the question of the notion of normality and compares normative to
statistical views of this notion.
.. Interpretations of GEN
As already recalled, the tripartite structure on which most of the current approaches
build () was introduced by Farkas and Sugioka (), as a major novelty against
Carlson’s unitary operatorGn (see discussion in section ...). Let us recall here that
GEN is a sentential operator (see ()), taking a restrictor and a nuclear scope. More
speci-cally, it is an unselective quanti-er that can bind any variable in its scope. For
reasons of clarity we specify which variables are bound in each case we discuss.
() GEN [restrictor] [nuclear scope]
On the foundational analysis of GEN (see Farkas and Sugioka ; de Swart ;
Chierchia ; Kratzer ), GEN means essentially ‘generally, always’. Farkas and
Sugioka’s theory is grounded in the Lewisian (Lewis ) view that always, generally
are unselective quanti-cational adverbs which take sentential scope. GEN is argued to
be triggered by a silent when-clause, on the basis of the following argument. (a) is
interpreted as in (b). When a when-clause occurs with an overt AdvQ (c), the
when-clause provides the restriction for AdvQ. Hence in (a) a silent AdvQ called
GENmust be reconstructed, for which the silentwhen-clause provides the restriction.
GEN is considered to mean ‘always’.
() a. Fido barks.
b. Fido barks (when he is hungry).
c. Fido usually barks when he is hungry.
+e resulting LF for (a) is given in ():
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() a. GEN s[in(s,Fido)][barks(s,Fido)]
b. Always/Usually in relevant situations that involve Fido, Fido barks.
Being unselective, GEN can also bind individuals. +e sentence (a) receives the
analysis in (b) (here we suppress the details pertaining to the relation between
kinds and their realizing instances).
() a. Bears are intelligent when they have blue eyes.
b. GEN x [bear(x) & have blue eyes (x)] [intelligent (x)]
In Farkas and Sugioka two questions are raised, which punctuate the subsequent liter-
ature on generics.+e -rst is the relation between GEN and universal quanti-cation.
GEN is known to tolerate exceptions, and Farkas and Sugioka subsequently argue
that GEN should be interpreted as a vague universal quanti-er. +e second pertains
to the causal reasoning that underlies the interpretation of GEN.+ey explain that a
pragmatic component must dismiss as irrelevant cases in which the restrictor is false
(making the sentence come out true).
Krifka et al. propose a modal analysis of GEN (they mainly discuss the matter in
relation to inde-nite singular generic sentences as they treat BNs as referring to kinds).
On this intensional analysis of GEN, (a) is interpreted as in (b).+e if -clause
provides the restriction for GEN. GEN is interpreted as an intensional unselective
universal quanti-er meaning ‘must’ (Krifka et al. ). On the assumption that
inde-nites contribute a free variable ranging over individuals (Kamp ; Heim
), that variable can be bound by the available universal quanti-er as well (for
further details, see Eckardt ).
Krifka et al. assume a classical modal framework in whichW is a set of worlds, D
a domain of entities, and! an ordering source on worlds according to normality.
() a. A dog barks.
b. If something is a dog, it barks.
c. ∀w′ !w, x[dog(x,w′)][barks(x,w′)]
Paraphrase: in all worlds which are ‘normal’, if something is a dog in those
worlds, then it barks in those worlds.
Current analysis of GEN is divided on the matter of whether GEN means ‘always’
or if it is an intensional operator. In section ..., we discussed criticisms of
those approaches that hold GEN to mean ‘always’ (see Ferreira  for criticism of
de Swart’s  approach). In the rest of this introduction we mostly consider the
modal analysis of GEN (although we return to the view of Farkas and de Swart 
in section ....).
+e current debate can be mainly categorized into two types of approaches. Firstly,
in section ..., we consider the views which have provided di/erent interpretations
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for GEN according to the linguistic form used for the generalization, and, in partic-
ular, according to whether an inde-nite singular (a) or a bare plural (b) (or a
de-nite plural in Romance languages (c)) is used.
() a. A raven is black.
b. Ravens are black.
c. Les corbeaux sont noirs.
Secondly, we dedicate section .. to some other new approaches to GEN and char-
acterizing sentences more broadly, which have not paid attention to the linguistic
di/erences between types of generic sentences, and which have mainly considered
bare plural sentences such as (c).
... Inde*nite singular, bare plural, and de*nite plural generics in contrast
.... Empirical scope As was made clear in Krifka et al. , and as already
noted, there are essentially two means for obtaining the generic interpretation. +e
-rst is by direct reference to kinds.+is can be obtained by using the singular de-nite
(a) or (according to certain authors, see in particular Carlson b and subse-
quent work), by using bare plurals (BP), as in (b).+e BP is, according to this view,
the name of the kind ‘lion’.
() a. +e lion has a mane (reference to kind).
b. Lions have a mane.
+e second way to obtain the generic interpretation of the sentence is by using char-
acterizing sentences. Inde-nite singular (IS) sentences () are agreed to be a type
of characterizing sentence.
() A lion has a mane.
As we discuss in the sequel to the Introduction, according to some authors (e.g.
Cohen a; Greenberg ) BP statements such as (b) are also characterizing
sentences, in the sense that the BP does not directly refer to kinds. From now on we
refer to inde-nite singular generic sentence as ISs, and to bare plural generic sentences
as BPs.
In some Romance languages, aside from direct reference to kinds obtained when
the singular de-nite is used (a)–(a), when singular inde-nites (b)–(b)
and plural de-nites (c)–(c) are used, characterizing sentences are obtained.We
refer to plural de-nite generic statement as DGs.
() a. (It.) Il leone ha una criniera.
!e lion has a mane.
b. (It.) Un leone ha una criniera.
A lion has a mane.
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c. (It.) I leoni hanno una criniera.
!e lions have a mane.
() a. (Fr.) Le lion a une crinière.
!e lion has a mane.
b. (Fr.) Un lion a une crinière.
A lion has a mane.
c. (Fr.) Les lions ont une crinière.
!e lions have a mane.
Here we consider theories of BPs and DGs that analyze them in ways other than as
names of kinds and strive to explain them in relation to ISs.
.... Analytic vs Synthetic? ISs and BPs in English, like ISs and DGs in
Romance languages, do not seem to express the same type of generalizations.
ISs, in English and in Romance languages, have been claimed to express law-like
statements and to be compatible only with essential properties, as the contrast in
(a)–(b) illustrates. (a) has been argued to be acceptable as ‘polyphonic’ is a
de-nitional property ofmadrigals, whereas (b)would be unacceptable as ‘popular’
is not a de-nitive property of madrigals. BPs have been noted to be compatible with
both essential properties (a) and accidental generalizations (b) (Lawler ;
Dahl ; Burton-Roberts ; Cohen a; Greenberg ; Mari b,a).
+e same observations hold for ISs ((a) vs (b)) and DGs ((a) (b)) in
Romance languages (herewe consider Italian, but the same contrasts hold for French).
() a. A madrigal is polyphonic.
b. *A madrigal is popular.
() a. Madrigals are polyphonic.
b. Madrigals are popular.
() a. Un madrigale è polifonico.
A madrigal is polyphonic.
b. *Un madrigale è popolare.
*A madrigal is popular.
() a. I madrigali sono polifonici.
‘!e’ madrigals are polyphonic.
b. I madrigali sono popolari.
‘!e’ madrigals are popular.
Much disagreement remains however when it comes to the analysis of these
statements.
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We -rst consider the shortcomings of the theories elaborated at the time of !e
Generic Book in section ...., and then move on to new approaches in section
.....
.... ISs and BPs in Krifka et al. () Krifka et al. begins by explaining that
the main di/erence between bare plurals and singular inde-nites is that the former
but not the latter can be used for direct kind predication.
() a. Dinosaurs are extinct.
b. *A dinosaur is extinct.
On this view, (a) expresses a property of the kind ‘dinosaur’, represented as
‘↑ dinosaurs’. (b) are instead considered as characterizing sentences and the sin-
gular inde-nite does not support a predicate of kinds.
Krifka et al. () thus focus on ISs and assume as a starting point the intensional
analysis in (c) repeated in ().
() ∀w′ !w, x[dog(x,w′)][barks(x,w′)]
Contra the commonly held assumption that ISs express only de-nitional statements
(e.g. Lawler ; Burton-Roberts ), Krifka et al. note that there are a variety of
ISs, including de-nitional and non-de-nitional (see also Putnam ). What varies
according to Krifka et al. is the type of modal base: this can be abilitative, deontic,
circumstantial . . .
+e modal base is deontic in (a), ablitative in (b), and realistic in (c).
+e choice of modal base is determined by the corresponding sentence with an overt
modality, as presented in (a), (b), and (c).
() a. A gentleman opens the door for ladies.
b. A boat ,oats.
c. A turtle lives a long time.
() a. A gentleman must open the door for ladies.
b. ??A boat can ,oat.
c. A turtle can live a long time.
+is treatment encounters at least two shortcomings that Krifka et al. did not fail to
note (see also discussion in Mari forthcoming).
Firstly, ISs with covert modality are not always synonymous with those with overt
modality, as the oddness of (b) reveals ((b) is however perfectly -ne). Con-
sequently, cases in which the modal is overt or covert should be distinguished and
treated separately. As we show below, while it is reasonable to endorse a classical
treatment of modal statements when the modal is overt, extending the account to
cases in which it is covert is a more risky theoretical choice.
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A second shortcoming pertains to (c). Krifka et al. (: ) write:
. . . +is sentence evokes a kind of “realistic” modality in which the laws of biology hold.
However, the worlds in which no turtle ever dies a premature death are biologically highly
abnormal . . .
Another potential problem for the modal account as stated in Krifka et al. is that
allowing the use of any type ofmodal base cannot rule out temporary properties (),
since in most circumstantially normal worlds it is true that raps are popular.
() *A rap is popular.
Various theories have been proposed, which are an elaboration of the LF in ().
+ese theories also do not claim that BPs are names of kinds, and thus closely consider
the elaboration of () that is induced by the use of an inde-nite singular, and that
which results from the use of a bare plural (in English) or a de-nite plural (in Romance
languages).
.... New approaches of IS/BP and IS/DG
Uni,ed quanti,cational account Greenberg’s () account, while recognizing
the contrast between (a) and (b) (see Lawler  and Dahl ), does not
subscribe to the claim that ISs are de-nitional whereas BPs express descriptive gen-
eralizations, as for instance () is a perfectly acceptable sentence, although it is not
de-nitional.
() a. A madrigal is polyphonic / *popular.
b. Madrigals are polyphonic / popular.
() A Norwegian student wears green socks.
Greenberg’s claim is that both ISs and BPs should be treated as quanti-cational
statements. In essence, bare plurals are treated as inde-nites, which also provide a
variable bound by GEN. GEN is analyzed in an intensional framework. +e novelty
of Greenberg’s account is that it captures the variety of available interpretations for ISs
and BPs by appealing to two di/erent types of accessibility relations (in the framework
of Kratzer a,b).
Speci-cally, in Greenberg’s setting, the accessibility relation between worlds can be
of two types. It can be an ‘in virtue of ’ property or a ‘maximal similarity relation’.
ISs appeal to an ‘in virtue of ’ property.
() a. A boy does not cry (in virtue of ‘being tough’)
b. ∀w′[∀x[boy(x,w′)]→ [tough(x,w′)]]→
[∀x, s[boy(x,w′)]→ [∼cry(x,w′)]]
c. Paraphrase: In all worlds where every boy is tough, every boy does not cry
(in all relevant situations s).
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+is analysis is strongly reminiscent of the treatment of dispositional statements.
Saying that sugar is soluble means that it dissolves in water in virtue of an intrinsic
property of sugar. Similarly, to state that a boy does not cry means that a boy does
not cry in virtue of some intrinsic property of boys. +is straightforwardly and cor-
rectly captures that madrigals are polyphonic by appealing to the internal make-up of
madrigals (e.g. Fara ).
Greenberg extends the quanti-cational approach to BP statements, whose analysis
is given in (b). Here the accessibility relation between worlds is simply maximal
similarity (Max).
() a. Professors wear a tie.
b. ∀w′[Max(w,w′)]→
[∀x, s[professors(x,w′) ∧ C(s, x,w′)]→ [wear a tie(s, x,w′)]]
c. Paraphrase: +e generalization ‘every professor wears a tie’ is non-
accidental—not limited to the actual world—but is expected to hold in
other, non-actual worlds which are maximally similar to the actual world.
Both (a) and (a) express generalizations over individuals. +e normative vs
descriptive ,avor distinction is thus derived by accommodating two di/erent types of
accessibility relations.
+is type of quanti-cational account has been criticized on di/erent grounds.
Firstly, with regard to universal quanti-cation over possible worlds,Menéndez-Benito
( and present volume) has recently noted that some cases are not properly cap-
tured; (a) is paraphrasable as (b) but not as (c).
() a. A car goes  kph.
b. A car can go  kph.
c. A car must go  kph.
Secondly, there are cases for which it is hardly possible to -nd an ‘in virtue’ of property
that justi-es the causal relation between property P and property Q, as in the cases
following in () (see also Corblin, this volume).
() a. A refrigerator costs  in Europe.
b. A soccer player earns a lot of money.
+irdly, if by some means an ‘in virtue of ’ property were to be found that enabled
(), then this same procedure could be used to justifyAmadrigal is popular. Green-
berg’s account thus seems to overgeneralize (seeKrifka, present volume). Finally, it has
to be emphasized that Greenberg’s account is speci-c to English. Here bare plurals are
used, which are considered to provide a variable to be bound by GEN.+is quanti--
cational approach cannot be adopted as such for DGs in Romance languages since
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descriptive generalizations are expressed by de-nites, which are referential expres-
sions and consequently cannot provide a variable in the way bare plurals do (see
Beyssade ; Farkas and de Swart , and section .... of this introduction).
Non-uni,ed quanti,cational accounts: the rules and regulations hypothesis. +e
alternative approach, namely the non-uni-ed quanti-cational account, also strives to
capture the intuition that IS sentences have a de-nitional ,avor that is absent from BP
sentences. We consider the treatment of ISs and BPs in turn.
ISs in non-uni,ed quanti,cational accounts. +is alternative view claims that IS
statements are not generalizations about individuals but rather they assert the exis-
tence of a rule. +e main exponents of this view are Burton-Roberts (), revived
and formalized in Cohen (a). Under the rules and regulation hypothesis it has
been argued that (b) is felicitous only if a rule is posited that regulates the opening
days of Italian restaurants. In fact, it has been argued that it is not even necessary that
there are actual Italian restaurants and that, as o0en noted (see Krifka et al. : )
inde-nite generic sentences do not require that actual individuals exist.
() a. (It.) Un ristorante Italiano è chiuso il martedì.
b. (En.) An Italian restaurant is closed on Tuesday.
A sentence like () is thus analyzed as expressing the proposition in (). +e
propositional function is shi0ed into a rule by an appropriate operator ‘!’ (see Lewis
). A rule does not express propositional content and Cohen (a) argues that
rules only have to conform to the models in which the proposition expressed by the
entailment is true. +e major question that remains open is what the analysis of the
proposed entailment should be.
() A gentleman opens the doors for ladies.
() !(gentleman(x)→ open-doors-for-ladies(x))
On a technical basis, Cohen explains that ISs are not quanti-cational on the following
grounds.+e peculiarity of generic inde-nites is that they do not refer to a particular
entity. In his words, they do not provide a topic. A topic is argued to be necessary
in order to feed the restriction of a quanti-er. Hence GEN cannot be used as its
restriction would be empty.
+e exact form of the entailment in () is intentionally le0 unexplained, and
Cohen suggests that it might be further elaborated into universal quanti-cation over
possible worlds and individuals, thus espousing the classical view of unselective bind-
ing approaches.
 See Mari (b) for French.
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Cohen (a) then develops a theory of rules as expressing non-propositional
content, and argues that all inde-nite generics express is that there is a rule which
conforms to the models in which the proposition expressed by the entailment is true.
Proponents of the rules and regulations hypothesis have also paid a great deal of
attention to the pragmatic behavior of IS sentences and have emphasized the fact that
inde-nite statements have a prescriptive use () (Corblin ) or a moral ,avor
(Cohen d).
() Una pianta ha bisogno di acqua per vivere!
A plant needs water to live!
On this view, it has been argued that ISs are in fact not compatible with exceptions.
For instance, Burton-Roberts () observes that ‘if Emile does not as a rule open
doors for ladies, his mother could utter () and thereby successfully imply that
Emile was not, or was not being a gentleman’. One cannot thus maintain that if
Emile does not open doors for ladies he could be an exception to the generalization.
+e generalization holds ‘necessarily’ for all individuals. If one does not satisfy the
generalization he is simply not a gentleman.
+e rules and regulations hypothesis also faces some problems.
. Firstly, it undermines the fact that exceptional individuals can still be accom-
modated. (a)–(b) are compatible with the fact that there are soccer players
(in the third French league, for instance) who do not earn a lot of money, they are
nonetheless soccer players. What de-nes a soccer player is not his earning a lot of
money, as advocated in Mari and Martin (a).
() a. A soccer player earns a lot of money.
b. (Fr.) Un footballer gagne beaucoup d’argent.
It is nevertheless correct that in some cases, IS sentences have a prescriptive use and
are used as de-nitions. However, IS statements with prescriptive use usually have an
overt modality as in () or (), as noted in Carlier () for French.
() Une jeune femme doit bien se comporter.
A young lady must behave well.
In these cases the standard Kratzerian analysis of deontic modality can apply. Here,
the choice of the modal base is determined by the modal itself (see Krifka et al. ).
In () the modality is deontic and the prescriptive use is enhanced by the deontic
reading of the modal.+e sentence () with the semi-modal need is thus analyzed
as ‘it is necessary that plants get watered’.
In cases which have been argued to have a prescriptive use, and in which there is no
overtmodality, such as (), the role of prosody has been undermined. +ese state-
 Note that without speci-c prosody the sentence is also acceptable. However, in that case the prescrip-
tive reading is unavailable and the sentence merely expresses a generalization about what gentleman do.
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ments can become rules only if they are turned into imperatives by the appropriate
intonation. In this case, their prescriptive use correlates with their being imperatives
rather than assertions (formore on the relation between deontics and imperatives, see
Ninan ; Schwager ; Portner ). In conclusion, IS statements have truth
values, unlike what is claimed by the rules-and-regulations-like accounts.
. +e major di3culty encountered by the rules and regulations hypothesis is that
the relation between facts and rules is not su3ciently spelled out. A rule that is in
e/ect, is in e/ect in the actual world. However, sometimes facts do not conform to
the rule. Let us consider the case of the old turtle again:
() A turtle lives a long time.
+e rule that a turtle lives a long time is in e/ect. Sill, most of turtles die young
(because of predation).How can one reconcile facts with rules? A0er all, what the gen-
eralization expresses is still a generalization about the turtle that dies young because
of predators. It is true that this turtle also has the property of dying old (in the absence
of predators). In other words, the rule according to which turtles die old is in e/ect
even for turtles that die young.
Developments of the rules and regulations hypothesis Mari (b) proposes dis-
secting the common ground into a world index w and a perspective index i. Facts are
one and the same in the actual world, but they can be enlightened by di/erent perspec-
tives. A turtle dies old under the biological perspective. However, the perspective is
about turtles that are in the actual world. InMari (a), the index i is assimilated to
the judge parameter and she claims that ISs have di/erent truth conditions according
to di/erent judges.
Krifka (present volume) criticizes this approach. Krifka espouses the view that
the common ground can be dissected into two indices—a world index w and an
interpretation index i andmaintains that ISs are de-nitional, along the lines of Burton-
Roberts (for a reply to Krifka (present volume) see Mari forthcoming).
BPs in non-uni,ed quanti,cational approaches As mentioned at the beginning of
section (....), Krifka et al. () propose treating BPs as cases of direct kind
predication. Cohen (a) extensively criticizes this view with the aim of showing
that a quanti-cational account using GEN should be used for bare plurals as well.
Cohen’s arguments proceed as follows:
. Generic sentences postulated to be cases of direct kind predication are intuitively
about individuals, as in ().
() Kings are generous.
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. One way of testing cases of direct-kind predication is by showing that it
is impossible to modify the sentence by an overt adverb of quanti-cation
().
() Dinosaurs are *always/*usually/*sometimes extinct
However, the following sentences are acceptable, showing that these are not cases of
direct-kind predication.
() a. Madrigals are always popular.
b. Kings are usually generous.
c. Rooms are sometimes square.
. A third problem for Krifka et al.’s view of BPs as names of kinds arises when one
considers scope ambiguities. If BPs were cases of direct-kind predication, they
should not involve scope ambiguities, and yet the data shows that they do.+e
following example is from Cohen (a).
() Madrigals are popular with exactly one music fan.
Cohen (a: ) argues that on one reading, for any givenmadrigal there is exactly
one music fan with whom it is popular; on a second reading the sentence asserts
that there is exactly one music fan who likes madrigals.+ese readings could not be
di/erentiated if the logical form of () involved no quanti-cation.
Having argued that generic BPs do not primarily refer to kinds (see facts ()–
()) Cohen maintains a quanti*cational approach using GEN. As distinct from
singular inde-nites, BPs provide a speci-c entity which the sentence is about, hence
a topic. A topic, it is argued, is needed to provide the restriction of a quanti-er and
GEN can thus apply. While arguing that BPs are not cases of direct-kind predication,
Cohen posits that for providing a speci-c entity they contribute a kind in the -rst
place. However, admitting that the sentence in () is not about kinds, but about
individual kings, Cohen argues that individual kings are triggered by an appropriate
coercion operation and the LF proposed for BPs is as in (). ↑king stands for the
kind ‘king’ and C returns the instances x belonging to the kind ‘king’.
() Kings are generous.
() GENx [C(x, ↑king)] [generous(x)]
Paraphrase: in general the x that belongs to the kind ‘king’ are generous
.... A comparison between BP and DG
Empirical resemblances +e idea that BPs refer to a speci-c entity underlies a
number of approaches to the analysis of DGs in Romance languages (see ()).
Various authors have claimed that they denotemaximal sums (see e.g. Beyssade ;
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Dobrovie-Sorin , and more particularly Farkas and de Swart , and Mari,
a).
() Les rois sont généreux.
Kings are generous.
As a matter of fact, BPs in English and DGs in Romance languages give rise to very
similar interpretations, and seem to pattern alike in many respects. Firstly, they both
express generalizations about individuals.
() Les rois sont généreux.
Kings are generous.
Secondly, each can express both de-nitional and accidental generalizations.
() a. (En.) Madrigals are popular.
b. (Fr.) Les madrigaux sont populaires.
+irdly, they both contrast with the singular de-nite, in that they can express gen-
eralizations that concern individuals, regardless of whether they belong to well-
established kinds or not (see discussion in Vendler , Carlson b: ).
() a. +e Bengal tiger is dangerous.
b. ??+e wounded tiger is dangerous.
() a. Le tigre du Bengale est dangereux.
b. ??Le tigre blessé est dangereux.
() a. Bengal tigers are dangerous.
b. Wounded tigers are dangerous.
() a. Les tigres du Bengale sont dangereux.
b. Les tigres blessés sont dangereux.
Fourthly, they seem to exhibit the same scope ambiguities. As was seen in (),
() also has two di/erent interpretations. As above, on one reading, for any given
madrigal there is exactly one music fan with whom it is popular; on a second reading
the sentence asserts that there is exactly one music fan who likes madrigals. Again,
this should lead us to conclude that these readings could not be di/erentiated if the
logical form of () involved no quanti-cation.
() (lt.) I madrigali sono popolari con esattamente un fan.
Madrigals are popular with exactly one music fan.
Ultimately, given these resemblances, various authors have tried to trigger a quanti--
cational analysis from the premise that a de-nite plural refers to a speci-c entity (i.e. a
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maximal sum). Here we consider two recent works which have provided full-,edged
logical forms for DGs.
Farkas and de Swart () Farkas and de Swart propose a uni-ed account for BPs
and DGs. To begin with, following Ojeda , they assume that BPs and DGs denote
kinds, and they identify kinds with the highest node of a lattice (e.g. Link a).
Following Chierchia (), they also assume that maximal sums are intensional.
+ey explain that both BPs and DGs refer to such plural objects in virtue of their
plurality feature.
For DGs, they propose the following analysis.
() a. (Fr.) Les chiens sont intelligents.
!e dogs are intelligent.
b. GENs[!dog(x) ∧ Pl(x)∧in(x, s)][intelligent(x, s)]
+e-rst assumption is thatGENquanti-es over situations.+ey also assume thatDGs
introduce a determined referent (‘!’ in (b) expresses determined reference) that
participates in the situation s.+is referent is a maximal set of individuals (Pl) and it
is the kind. GEN compares two sets of situations in which the elements of the kind are
involved.Members of the kind are triggered by a distribution operation yielded by the
distributive predicate to be intelligent (as forCohen a). In (), the interpretation
is obtained that most of the situations that comprise a determinate set of dogs are
situations in which dogs are intelligent. On the same assumption that GEN quanti-es
over situations, the analysis of BPs is given in () (dog(x) in the following LF is a
term).
() a. Dogs are intelligent.
b. GENs[dog(x) ∧ Pl(x)∧in(x, s)][intelligent(x, s)]
+e authors explain that the BP does not assert determined reference. However, in
virtue of its pluralmorphology, such a determined referent is accommodated and this
referent is again the kind. Again, GEN compares two sets of situations, each involving
the elements of the kind. Here ‘!’ is missing as the BP is not considered to primarily
assert determined reference, rather determined reference is triggered via the plural
feature of the BP.
It is easy to see that from the perspective of the operation of generalization, it does
not really matter whether the determined reference is asserted or accommodated and
the same interpretation is in fact obtained for BPs and DGs.
In spite of the numerous similarities between BPs and DGs, in Romance languages
() is not ambiguous in the same way as its English correspondent () is, as
illustrated in their corresponding available paraphrases given respectively in ()
and ().
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() Typhoons arise in this area of the Paci-c.
() a. Paraphrase  In general typhoons arise in this area of the Paci-c
b. Paraphrase +ere are typhoons arising in this area of the Paci-c
() I tifoni sorgono in questa parte del Paci-co.
Typhoons arise in this area of the Paci*c.
() a. Paraphrase  In generale i tifoni sorgono in questa parte del Paci-co
In general typhoons arise in this area of the Paci*c.
b. Paraphrase  ??Ci sono i tifoni in questa parte del Paci-co
!ere are typhoons arising in this area of the Paci*c.
Under the interpretation in (b), () expresses in fact that it is a property of
this part of the Paci-c that there are typhoons, and it thus expresses a generalization
about a location (see Kratzer ) rather than about individuals.+is interpretation
is unavailable with DGs in Romance.
+is constraint can be derived from a general requirement about DGs, namely that
they denote a set of entities whose existence is asserted (or presupposed). Since BPs
and DGs are treated on a par in Farkas and de Swart (), this discrepancy between
the available uses of BPs and DGs cannot be captured. However, in view of the fact
that their analysis explains most of the similarities between BPs and DGs, it should
not be abandoned entirely.
.... DG in Romance: more on individuals and situations Building on Farkas
and de Swart’s idea that DGs assert the existence of a maximal plural entity, Mari
(a) proposes an analysis which captures the ability of DGs to express both induc-
tive generalizations (b) and de-nitional statements (a). Inductive generaliza-
tions rest on observation, whereas de-nitional statements do not.
() a. (It.) I madrigal sono polifonici.
‘!e’ madrigals are polyphonic.
b. (It.) I madrigal sono popolari.
‘!e’ madrigals are popular.
 Two explanations can be given according to whether de-nites are considered to assert existence and
maximality à la Russell, or whether they are considered to contribute maximality plus a presupposition
of existence à la Frege-Strawson. Let us adopt the Russellian view. According to Russell, inde-nites also
contribute assertion of existence. In this respect both BPs (considered as inde-nites) and DGs would be
out in these constructions since for both existence would be asserted twice.Maintaining the Russellian view
for de-nites and adopting the Kamp-Heim view for inde-nites (according to which they only contribute
a free variable) is one way to solve the problem: existence is asserted twice only for de-nites and for this
reason they are ruled out. Alternatively, one can assume with Zucchi () that de-nites cannot be used
in there-constructions because strong determiners presuppose the existence of their referent (according to
the Frege-Strawson view of de-nites).
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She also notes that DGs support various types of exceptional individuals, according to
whether they express inductive generalizations or de-nitional statements. According
to the non-de-nitional (inductive) interpretation, actual individuals can be used as
exceptions, as in (). In this case, reference is made to an actual set of professors.
() I professori nella mia università portano la cravatta. Ma no, guarda Giovanni.
‘!e’ professors in my university wear a tie. Oh no! Look at John!
When a rule is asserted, as in (a), where a rule of my university is being described,
the generalization hardly tolerates actual individuals as exceptions. Classes of indi-
viduals can be instead used as exceptions to rules.
() a. Nella mia università i professori portano la cravatta, (*)tranne Gianni
In my university, the professors wear a tie, (*)but John
b. Nella mia università i professori portano una cravatta, tranne quelli
associati
In my university, the professors wear a tie, but the associate ones
Based on Farkas and de Swart’s assumption that DG denotes a maximal set of enti-
ties, Mari (a) proposes an account that explicitly captures these distinctions and
which spells out more carefully the role played by situations. Moreover, the proposed
account derives the intensionality of the maximal referent introduced by the de-nite
in a more principled way (without assuming that by virtue of denoting the maximal
entity of a lattice, that entity is intensional, as in Chierchia ()). Her view builds
on Schwarzschild’s () recent implementation according to which de-nites denote
a -xed set of elements in a situation and come equipped in the logical form with a
situation variable. Along with Kratzer (), Mari assumes that situations are parts
of worlds. Situations and worlds are thus introduced as variables in the LF. Various
operations can be enacted over the domain of these variables, and thus various inter-
pretations can be obtained.
. +e world variable and the situation variable are lambda-abstracted (). In
this case, once the world and the situation of evaluation are -xed, what the sentence
asserts is that the members of a maximal sum (represented as ιX) all have a certain
property Q. Q being a distributive predicate, universal quanti-cation over members
of the maximal entity denoted by the plural de-nite is obtained.
() λs,w ιX(P(ιX, s,w) ∧ ∀x ∈ ιXQ(ιX, s,w))
For a given world w, a situation s, and the maximal sum X of individuals, the
maximal sum is P in s,w, and for all elements x in X, x is Q in s,w.
With these binding of the variables s and w, the inductive generalization is obtained.
+is analysis applies to (). Since it is entailed that there are actual individuals,
actual exceptional individuals can be accommodated.
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. +e world variable and the situation variable are bound by a universal quanti-er
(). In this case the de-nitional reading of the sentence is obtained: if one of the
members of the maximal sum is a P entity, then it is also a Q entity.
() ∀s,w ιX(P(ιX, s,w) → ∀x ∈ ιXQ(x, s,w))
For all worlds w, situations s, and the maximal sum X, if the maximal sum is
P in s,w, then, for all elements x in X, x is Q in s,w.
+is analysis applies to (b). Since the existence of actual individuals is not entailed
by the expressed de-nition, it is di3cult to accommodate actual individuals as
exceptions.
+e idea behind the latitudes of accommodation of exceptions is that these have
to be of the same semantic type as the individuals which the generalization is about.
When the generalization is about actual individuals, actual individuals can be used as
exceptions.When the generalization is about classes (i.e. sets of actual and non-actual
individuals bearing a certain description), classes can be used as exceptions.
. In a third con-guration, the world is lambda-abstracted and the situation vari-
able is bound by the universal quanti-er.
() λw,∀s ιX(P(ιX, s,w) ∧ ∀x ∈ ιXQ(ιX, s,w))
For a given world w, for all situations s and the maximal sum X, the maximal
sum is P in s,w, and for all elements x in X, x is Q in s,w.
+is derives the intended interpretation for (). In these worlds, in all situations in
which there is a madrigal, a madrigal is popular.
() I madrigali sono popolari. (see (b))
!e madrigals are popular.
+e analysis proposed byMari (a) strengthens the point we havemade above: the
force of the generalization depends on the type of the situation/world that is targeted
(see also Corblin, present volume). If actual situations and worlds are considered,
() is obtained. If non-actual situations andworlds are considered () is obtained.
+is explains howDGs are able to express both de-nitional andnon-de-nitional state-
ments, as only () expresses the causal relationwhich is characteristic of de-nitional
statements and is absent from non-de-nitional ones (analyzed as in ()).
Moreover, treating DGs (and BPs) as referring to sets of individuals, and treating
universal quanti-cation as brought about by the distributive predicates -nds some
support in recent works in cognitive science showing that generics appear earlier than
quanti-ers in natural language (see discussion in section (...) below).
.... Plural inde-nites in French +e question of the interpretation of plural
generic inde-nites (des, Fr.; dei, It. . . . ) in Romance languages has been overlooked
in the literature on generics, mostly because the distributions are puzzling. Here we
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focus on French.+e core observations related to the use of des N in generic sentences
are the following.
. Des N is not always felicitous in contexts where un N is.
() a. Un carré a quatre côtés.
A square has four sides.
() b. *Des carrés ont quatre côtés.
‘des’ squares have four sides.
. Des can be used when a group denoting noun is used.
() Des jumeaux se ressemblent dans les moindres détails.
‘Des’ twins resemble each other to the smallest detail.
. Des N can be used when N is modi-ed (see Heyd ).
() Des carrés bien formés ont quatre côtés.
‘Des’ well-formed squares have four sides.
Various views have been proposed for these data (see in particular de Swart ; Cor-
blin ; Dobrovie-Sorin and Laca , and Dobrovie-Sorin andMari a,b). As
for the latter case, it has been argued that themodi-er introduces awhen-clause, which
goes into the restriction of GEN, which, in this case quanti-es over the situations that
this restriction provides (the analysis provided is along the lines of de Swart ).
Individuals are bound to situations via a skolem function f .
() GEN s [well-formed (f (s), s)] [four-sided (f (s), s)]
A disagreement remains for the contrast between (b) and ().
Corblin () explains that des is avoided in generic sentences for optimality
reasons. Since the generalizations using the inde-nite singular () and the inde-nite
plural would both concern singular individuals, the inde-nite singular is preferred.
+is explanation does not elucidate under what conditions des can be used.
Dobrovie-Sorin and Mari (a,b) have proposed that des can be used only if
the nouns contribute a suitable domain of quanti-cation for GEN.+ey propose the
following rule of quanti-cation:
() Constraint on quanti*cation: a quanti-er can only bind individuals.
Following Link () and Landman (b), they assume that groups are individual
and thus can be bound by GEN.+e LF that they propose for () is given in ():
() GEN X[X is a group of twins][X resemble each other]
 Here we use the term informally.
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Dobrovie-Sorin, present volume, further explores this hypothesis, resorting to a ban
against quanti-cation over part-whole structures, in line with Dobrovie-Sorin and
Mari (a,b).
.. Genericity and normality
We conclude this introduction by considering the relation between genericity and
normality and comparing three views of the notion of normality. +e theories pre-
sented here do not consider the lexical contribution of the determiners, and mainly
focus on plurals in English. We begin by considering Ariel Cohen’s (a) statistical
view, and contrast it with more normative views, such as those of Asher and Pelletier
() and Nickel ().
... Inductive judgments Ariel Cohen () proposes a uni-ed account of
generics (), and frequency statements (), in terms of relative probability.
() Birds ,y.
() Birds always ,y.
His probability-based analysis is intended to account for some puzzles, among which
are the following:
. A generic can be true even in the absence of instances supporting the general-
ization it expresses, as shown by the classical example ():
() Mary handles the mail from Antarctica.
+is is said to be true even for the descriptive reading of (): according to Cohen, in
order to have the truth of () without actual supporting instances it is not necessary
to give a prescriptive reading of this sentence, which would be motivated e.g. by the
description of Mary’s duties in her job contract.
. Generics and frequency statements are time-intensional but not world-
intensional, as is shownby the truth-conditional di/erence between () and () in
the scenario described below (), and by the truth-conditional equivalence between
() and () in the scenario described below ().
() A computer (always) computes the daily weather forecast.
() A computer (always) computes the main news item. Scenario: +e daily
weather forecast turns out to be the main news item today, as it is predicted
that a big rainstorm will hit Paris.
 It seems to us that the truth of () under its descriptive reading requires that actual instances ofMary
handling the mail from Antarctica have occurred by the reference time. It is precisely the past occurrence
of events of the relevant type which enables one to make a descriptive generalization.
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() A computer (always) computes Mary’s favorite column. Scenario: Mary’s
favorite column in the newspaper is the column of the daily weather forecast.
Notice that in the rainstorm scenario the descriptions the daily weather forecast and
the main news item turn out to corefer w.r.t. the present time, but do not corefer w.r.t.
any time, as tomorrow the main news item might well be something other than the
weather forecast.+ismeans that the two descriptions are not intensionally equivalent
w.r.t. the time parameter. On the other hand, in the scenario ofMary’s favorite column
not only do the descriptions the daily weather forecast and Mary’s favorite column
corefer w.r.t. the present time, but, given the general stability of people’s preferences,
they corefer w.r.t. any time within a signi-cant part ofMary’s lifespan (possibly within
the whole of Mary’s lifespan, if Mary’s preference persists throughout all her life), so
that they can be said to be (at least in part) intensionally equivalent w.r.t. the time
parameter. However, given the contingence of Mary’s preference for the weather fore-
cast, which need not hold in other possible worlds, the descriptions the daily weather
forecast and Mary’s favorite column are not intensionally equivalent w.r.t. the world
parameter.+is would show that intensional equivalence w.r.t. the time parameter is
all that is required to preserve the truth of generics and frequency statements.
. +ey are di/erent from temporary generalizations, as shown by the fact that, if
all SupremeCourt justices by sheer happenstance have a prime social security number
at this moment, () would be true but () would be false:
() All Supreme Court justices have a prime social security number.
() Supreme Court justices have a prime social security number.
. +ey imply a regular distribution of events in time.
. Judgments concerning their truth are more uncertain than judgments concern-
ing the truth of quanti-ed sentences.
. For them to be true it is not enough that the majority of individuals which are
in their actual domain satisfy their predicates.
As to the Logical Form of such statements, Cohen () assumes that they involve
dyadic quanti-ers expressing relations between properties. +e quanti-er in a fre-
quency statement like () is the frequency adverb always, whereas in a generics like
() it is a covert generic quanti-er GEN.+e Logical Forms of () and () are
() and (), respectively, given along with the relative probability judgments that
they correspond to:
() GEN(bird(x), ,y(x)) P(,y | bird) > . (the probability of an object ,ying given
that the object is a bird is greater than .)
() always(bird(x), ,y(x)) P(,y | bird) =  (the probability of an object ,ying given
that the object is a bird is equal to )
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+e probability judgments reported above are interpreted in a Branching Time frame-
work (+omason ), the idea being that when we make a probability judgment,
not only do we consider the sequence of events that we have actually observed, but
we also consider possible continuations of that sequence into the future.
De-nition: Relative probability in Branching Time P(ψ | φ)= l i+ for every admis-
sible history H and & > , there is an initial segment H’ of H such that for every
H” which is a continuation of H’ and is continued by H the relative probability of
ψ among φ in H” di/ers from l by less than &. Admissible histories are required
to be su3ciently long so as to have the relative probabilities in the subhistories H”
come close to the limiting value l by whatever value &, however small it may be, and
to contain instances of φ, as histories without such instances will make the relative
probabilities of ψ among φ unde-ned, they are required to be continuations of the
actual history, and to be similar to the actual history. On this analysis () is true
just in case in every admissible history H, the probability of an object x ,ying in H
given that x is a bird inH is some value l greater than .. A homogeneity requirement
is introduced as a presupposition of generics and frequency statements, according to
which the relative probability in every part of a suitable partition of any admissible
history H must be the same as the probability in the whole H. Suitable partitions are
contextually determined, and sometimes it may be unclear what partition is relevant
and di/erent speakers may entertain di/erent partitions.+is explains why speakers
give more uncertain judgments about the truth of generics than about the truth of
overtly quanti-ed statements.
... Reasoning with default Pelletier and Asher () propose a modal condi-
tional analysis of generics in which a relation of accessibility between worlds based
on a relativized notion of normality plays a crucial role. One of the main points on
which the authors base their proposal is that generics have truth conditions, though
these are more complex than the truth conditions of episodic sentences. As we have
mentioned above, the opposite view that they reject is that generics have the status of
rules and thus would not be truth-valued assertions in the -rst place. Another point
to which they devote signi-cant discussion is the intensional character of generics,
and in this respect they make an extensive criticism of purely extensional quanti--
cational theories. A central property that they wish to explain is the well-known
tolerance to exceptions, e.g. the fact that the truth of () is compatible with the
existence of dogs that due to particular accidents are not four-legged, and their related
ability to trigger logical inferences based on a defeasible rule of modus ponens, as
shown by ().
() Dogs have four legs.
() (a) Dogs have four legs. (b) Fido is a dog. (c)+erefore (defeasibly) Fido has
four legs.
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Concerning the problem of tolerance to exceptions, particularly puzzling are sen-
tences like ().
() Peafowls lay eggs.
Sentence () poses a special problem insofar as the tolerance to exceptions that it
displays is massive: assuming temporarily that generics are quanti-cational, all male
peafowls are excluded from the domain of quanti-cation. On the intensional analysis
they propose, generics turn out to have truth conditions, which for the authors is a
welcome result.+e modal conditional analysis can be illustrated by considering the
logical form that it assigns to sentence ().+is is given in (), and makes use of
a dyadic operator GEN with similar syntactic properties as the GEN of Krifka et al.
().+e modal truth conditions of the GEN formula are then given by the quan-
ti-cational formula () below, according to which the generic operator is de-ned
by means of a universal quanti-er binding x and another universal quanti-er over
possible worlds entertaining a certain relation to the actual world (as in Stalnaker’s
() and Lewis’s () classical analyses of conditional sentences):
() Birds ,y.
() GEN[x][bird(x)] [ ,y(x)]
() ∀x∀w [(x is a bird in w & w is normal with respect to w and to x’s being a
bird)→ (x ,ies in w)]
+e truth conditions in () can be paraphrased as follows: for every object x, the set
of worlds that are normal with respect both to the actual world and to the proposition
of x’s being a bird is a subset of the set of worlds in which x ,ies. +is analysis,
though involving a universal quanti-er over individuals, can account for the fact that
() can be true in spite of some birds (e.g. penguins or ostriches) not being able
to ,y. +e mechanism by which this is accounted for is the intensional component
represented by the universal quanti-cation over possible worlds: individual birds
(including penguins) are considered with respect to possible worlds in which they
possess all the properties that are normal for a bird in the actual world, and then they
are claimed to ,y relative to such worlds. +e intuition is that relative to worlds in
which penguins possess all the properties that are normal for a bird in the actualworld,
penguins do ,y. +is is an intuition that we could express by the true conditional If
penguins possessed all the properties that are actually normal for a bird, then penguins
would -y.+is analysis also explains why logical inferences based on a rule of modus
ponens, drawn from a major generic premise, are defeasible: the reason is that the
minor premise, being a factual statement, does not say whether the world relative to
which Birdie is said to be a bird (i.e. the actual world) is one in which Birdie possesses
all the properties that are normal for a bird in the actual world. +e crucial point
here is that by the accessibility relation underlying GEN it is not guaranteed that the
–––– -Mari-et-al-c-drv Mari-et-al (Typeset by SPi)  of  August ,  :
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF–REVISES, //, SPi
Introduction 
actual world itself is among the possible worlds accessible from it (the accessibility
is not a re-exive relation). To deal with the massive exception tolerance of the duck
example considered above, the authors acknowledge that the intensional component
encompassing the normality condition is not enough. For one thing, we may observe
that besides sentences like () above, there are also sentences like (), which also
exhibit massive exception tolerance:
() Peacocks have colorful feathers on their tails.
If the only factor that was responsible for the exception-tolerance property of ()
was the normality condition seen above, then () and (), which are intuitively
both true, could not be both true: if it were normal for peafowls to lay eggs, then
this would imply that it would be normal for peafowls to be hens (as only female
peafowls can lay eggs), and this in turn would imply that it would not be normal for
peafowls to have colorful feathers on their tails (as only male peafowls can have such
colorful feathers), but this would mean that () would be false, which is not. +e
authors propose that there is also a mechanism of covert domain restriction which is
operative in examples like () and (), by which the former is somehow restricted
to peahens, while the latter to peacocks.+is suggestion is tentative, but the authors
present it without developing it into an explicit account. Asher and Pelletier (this
volume) take on this issue and deal with it more in depth.
... !e notion of ‘normality’ Nickel () criticizes quanti-cational views of
generics by showing the failure of what he takes to be the best possible implementation
of the quanti-cational paradigm, namely the view for which the generic quanti-er
has the force of most. He refers to quanti-cational views of generics based on most
as majority-based views, and criticizes them on the basis of true generics like (),
which he claims to be equivalent to the sentential coordination ():
() Elephants live in Africa and Asia.
() Elephants live in Africa and elephants live in Asia.
What makes his criticism particularly interesting for us is that unlike previous crit-
icisms of the quanti-cational view of generics, such as the now classical analysis of
Pelletier andAsher (), it does not consider an extensional version of this view, but
a sophisticated intensional version, and shows how even such a sophisticated version
does not stand up to the threat of cases like () above. Consider a simple version
of the majority-based view (one which is already sophisticated enough to account for
the intensional character of generics). On this account, () has an LF like (),
whose truth conditions are informally stated in ():
() Ravens are black.
() GEN[ravens] [black]
() GEN[ravens] [black] is true i+ in a suitable domain, most ravens are black
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By relativizing to a suitable domain, (), one accounts for the modal nature of
generics, in particular one excludes that () may wind up false in a case in which,
by a mere accident, all ravens actually existing at the time of evaluation have become
white. While this analysis may well account for the truth conditions of (), Nickel
observes that in order to cope with (), and with the fact that this sentence does not
entail () (far from being so, the former is true while the latter is false), a majority-
based view has to accommodate a restriction of the domain of quanti-cation.
() Chickens lay eggs.
() Chickens are hens.
Intuitively, when we evaluate (), we consider the distribution of the property of
laying eggs not amongst chickens tout court, but amongst a restricted domain, the
domain of those chickens ‘that are even in the business of producing o/spring’ (Nickel
: ) – where this restrictive condition entails that such chickens must be hens.
+is domain restriction, asNickel recognizeswas pointed out byAriel Cohen (b),
is determined on the basis of the sentence’s main predicate lay eggs, which is clearly
related to the possibleways of producing o/spring.+is account can predict why ()
is false: the restriction induced by the predicate hens is to chickens that have some
gender, and this is a much larger domain than in the case of (). Following Ariel
Cohen (b) in assuming predicate-induced domain restrictions, the general form
of the majority-based view can be represented as in (), where ALT(F) is the set of
alternatives to the property F and ∨ALT(F) is the property of having at least one of
the properties in the set ALT(F):
() GEN[A] [F] is true i+ in a suitable domain, most As that are ∨ALT(F) are F
In the case of (),∨ALT(lay eggs) is equivalent to the property of being able to pro-
duce o/spring in some way or other, so that the sentence is predicted to be true just in
case in a suitable domain (larger than the actual world at the time of evaluation), most
chickens that are able to produce o/spring in some way or other, produce o/spring
by laying eggs. Nickel shows that even this very sophisticated majority-based view
of generics cannot account for the truth of the equivalent generics () and ().
According to this theory, () has the LF (), whose truth conditions are ():
() GEN[elephants; live in Africa] & G[elephants; live in Asia]
() GEN[elephants] [live in Africa] & GEN[elephants] [live in Asia] is true i+ in
a suitable domain, most elephants that are∨ALT(live in Africa) live in Africa
and in a suitable domain, most elephants that are ∨ALT(live in Asia) live in
Asia
Given the plausible assumptions that the suitable domains in the two conjuncts of
the truth condition in () are the same domain, and that the domain restriction
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properties ∨ALT(live in Africa) and ∨ALT(live in Asia) in this truth condition are
the same property (plausibly, the property of living in some habitat or other), the
majority-based analysis makes the wrong prediction that for () to be true (and
the same holds for ()), there must be elephants that live both in Africa and in Asia,
which is plainly incorrect. In view of problematic examples like (), Nickel proposes
an inquiry-based account in which the truth of a generic sentence is not a matter of
what is true most of the time but a matter of what inductive target is established in
a conversation, where an inductive target in turn determines a way (or, possibly and
crucially, di/erent alternative ways) of being normal in some respect.+e concept of
being normal is assumed by Nickel as a primitive concept, for which no analysis in
statistical terms is provided. In the case of the problematic (), a plausible scenario
in which we can imagine this sentence uttered is one where the inductive target of the
conversation concerns the habitats in which elephants normally live, and the crucial
point is that this inductive target determines more than one way of being normal:
relative to one such way w, it is normal for elephants to live in Asia, while relative to
another such way w, it is normal for them to live in Africa. Nickel’s intuitive point
here is that it is equally normal for elephants to live in Africa and to live in Asia,
although relative to di/erent ways of being normal (with respect to the same feature
of living in a certain habitat). +e truth conditions that Nickel’s account assigns to
() (and hence to the equivalent sentence ()) are given in (), where we still
have (universal) quanti-cation over elephants, but this is crucially dependent on a
higher existential quanti-cation over ways of being normal, so that the domain of the
universal quanti-er is not the same in the two conjuncts:
() GEN[elephants] [live in Africa] & GEN[elephants] [live in Asia] is true i+
there is a way w of being a normal elephant w.r.t. its habitat, and all elephants
that are normal in w live in Africa, and there is a way w of being a normal
elephant w.r.t. its habitat, and all elephants that are normal in w live in Asia
Weobserve thatNickel’s semantic account of generics, like those ofAsher andPelletier
() and Ariel Cohen (a), retains a crucial aspect of the quanti-cational views,
namely the idea that generics of the form As are Bs do ultimately involve a form
of quanti-cation over individuals exemplifying A’s property, in this case universal
quanti-cation. In this respect, it must be noted that, although he criticizes previous
accounts of generics based on the idea that they express some kind of quanti-cational
relation between the subject and the predicate, and in particular Cohen’s proposal
to specify the quanti-cational import of the generic quanti-er in terms of relative
frequency of a property inside a reference class, Nickel’s own account as well seems to
leave it open how we should make sense of the observation made by some psycholo-
gists who report that generics are acquired comparatively earlier than quanti-cational
sentences (e.g. Leslie )—which would seem to suggest that generics might not be
quanti-cational in the end (as noted by Carlson b). Cimpian et al. () have
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recently claimed: ‘Although generics imply that the properties they refer to are preva-
lent (Gelman, Star, and Flukes, ), we argue that they do not mark quanti-cation
per se (see also Carlson a; Leslie ; Prasada ). Generics are a linguistic
means of expressing knowledge about categories, and as such their interpretation is
unlikely to be based solely on frequency information.’ Even though Nickel’s proposal
still retains semantic machinery from quanti-cational approaches, his emphasis on
the process by which the topic of a conversation determines a way in which members
of a category can be said to be normal and on a primitive concept of normality,
not de-ned in frequentist terms, makes it closer to such theoretical perspectives,
currently more familiar amongst cognitive scientists, as we have brie,y recalled
above.
.. Presentation of the papers in the volume
A -rst set of papers investigate genericity in the subject DP.
Carmen Dobrovie-Sorin’s paper ‘Generic Plural and Mass Inde-nites’ investigates the
constraints on the distribution of plural inde-nite generics in French and investigates
the constraints on plural quanti-cation.
Bert Le Bruyn, Min Que, and Henriëtte de Swart’s paper ‘+e Scope of Bare Nominals’.
Carlson (b) established that bare plurals in English always take narrow scope.
+e authors give a full presentation of the English version of the experiment and a
preview of the Mandarin Chinese and Dutch versions. +ese results shed doubt on
the received view of the scopal properties of English bare plurals and, if replicated
for other languages, will force a change in the way we model the semantics of bare
nominals universally.
Stefan Hinterwimmer’s paper ‘Free Relatives as Kind-Denoting Terms’ shows that the
puzzling behavior of Free Relatives as de-nites in some contexts and inde-nites in
others is best accounted for if we locate the ambiguity in a covert operator that either
returns an extensional or an intensional (maximal) sum individual.
Gerhard Schaden, in his paper ‘Two Ways of Referring to Generalities in German’,
shows that in nominal ‘reference to a generality’ in German, nouns may appear either
bare or with a de-nite determiner. He investigates the distribution of both variants
and the relative impact of discourse structure.
+e following set of papers address the question of genericity in the verbal domain.
Nora Boneh and Edit Doron’s paper ‘Hab and Gen in the Expression of Habituality’
argues, based on the study of English habitual forms, that two di/erent modal oper-
ators may be found in the expression of habituality: Gen, a quanti-cational modal
operator, and Hab, a summational modal operator.+e paper also discusses how the
proposed operators interact with mood on the one hand, and two di/erent aspectual
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dimensions on the other: a viewpoint aspect distinction between imperfective and
perfective, and a perspective distinction between internal and external (retrospective)
perspective.
Patricia Cabredo Hofherr’s paper ‘Bare Habituals and Singular Inde-nites’ examines
habitual sentences across various languages. Based on the scope properties of bare
singulars in bare habituals she argues that habituals should not be analyzed in terms
of a scope-taking plurality operation but in terms of a plurality allowing distributive
readings with plural arguments. +is plurality resembles degree expressions such as
beaucoup ‘a lot’, as degree expressions similarly do not induce scope ambiguities.
Fabio Del Prete’s paper, ‘Imperfectivity and Habituality in Italian’ proposes a semantic
analysis of Italian imperfective sentences which uniformly accounts for their habitual
and progressive readings. +e main contribution is a non-quanti-cational account
of imperfective habituals, based on a semantic analysis of verbs in terms of plural
events and a modal/temporal analysis of imperfective aspect as a forward-expanding
operator in a branching time model.
Anastasia Giannakidou and Eleni Staraki’s paper ‘Ability, Action and Causation: From
Pure Ability to Force’ shows empirically that Greek distinguishes ability as a precon-
dition for action, and ability as initiating and sustaining force for action. +e key,
they argue, is not perfective aspect (as is commonly thought), since actualized ability
emerges in Greek also with imperfective aspect and present tense.+e crucial factor,
we argue, is causation, which triggers a shi0 from pure ability to ability as action-
initiating energy.
Paula Menéndez-Benito’s paper ‘On Dispositional Sentences’ deals with the interpre-
tation of dispositional sentences such as!is car goes  khp. It defends a hypothe-
sis, originally proposed by Dahl (), according to which dispositional sentences
express existential quanti-cation over worlds. Following up on work by Lekakou
(), the covert possibility modal contributed by dispositionals is taken to select
a particular type of circumstantial modality.
Friederike Moltmann’s paper ‘On the Distinction between Abstract States, Concrete
States, and Tropes’ discusses and defends a distinction between ‘abstract states’ and
‘concrete states’, a distinction that has recently been proposed by Maienborn to
account for the peculiar semantic behavior of stative verbs. An explicit ontological
account of the notion of an abstract state is given and the distinction between abstract
and concrete states is related to the category of tropes (particularized properties).
+e last set of papers address the question of the interpretation of generic sentences.
Nicholas Asher and Francis Je+ry Pelletier, in their paper ‘More Truths about Generic
Truth’, defend and extend the modal approach to the analysis of generics.+ey review
several recent criticisms of this view and argue that the view withstands them. We
extend the modal approach by providing a sketch of a compositional analysis.
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Ariel Cohen’s paper ‘No Quanti-cation without Reinterpretation’ asserts that the
covert quanti-er GEN is generated by the hearer, as a process of reinterpretation of
the input. It establishes a di/erence between the generic and the habitual readings.
In generics, GEN is generated by a pragmatic process of Predicate Transfer, whereas
in habituals it is generated by a semantic process of type-shi0ing. +us while it is
the same quanti-er in both constructions, the process by which it is generated is
responsible for the di/erences between them.
Francis Corblin’s paper ‘+e Roots of Genericity: Inde-nite Singulars vs De-nite Plu-
rals’ builds on the observation that generic readings of singular inde-nites in French
(as opposed to plural de-nites) are rare and always come with a modal ,avor. It is
assumed that this reading is triggered by a mechanism of Universal Closure, which is
only triggered when the default mechanism, Existential Closure, is ruled out.
Manfred Krifka’s paper ‘De-nitional Generics’ investigates the interpretation of indef-
inite generic sentences and argues that these are de-nitional statements.
Bernhard Nickel’s paper ‘Dutchmen are Good Sailors: Generics and Gradability’
presents a novel treatment of generics such as ‘Dutchmen are good sailors’, exploiting
the interaction between a generic operator and gradable predicates.
